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INTRODUCTION: THE “GLASS SNEAKER” STILL EXISTS
This Article examines the prisms of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (hereinafter “Title IX”),2 the federal gender
discrimination statute applicable to educational programs and
activities, as it celebrates its thirtieth anniversary. It portrays Title
IX’s application to athletics through traditional curriculum
educational programs as well as extracurricular athletic activities,
including promoting equal opportunity for the recipient students
and student-athletes, as well as the attendant athletic personnel.
Remarkably, three decades after Title IX’s passage, the “glass
sneaker”3 continues to exist, limiting participation opportunities
and benefits for female athletes4 and athletic department positions,

2

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2000). This statute may now be cited as the “Patsy
Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act.” Pub. L. 107-255, 2002 H.J. Res.
113 (approved Oct. 29, 2002). President Richard M. Nixon signed Title IX into law on
June 23, 1972. President Nixon had purportedly made a concerted effort to have the first
woman appointed to the bench of the Supreme Court. Reportedly, the former president
uttered to Attorney General John Mitchell, “I don’t think a woman should be in any
government job whatever . . . mainly because they are erratic. And emotional. . . . I lean
to a woman only because, frankly, I think at this time, John, we got to pick up every half
a percentage point we can.” Jeffrey Rosen, Renchburg’s the One!, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2001, § 7 at 15, col. 1 (reviewing JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD
STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2001)).
3
The author coined this term to represent the glass ceiling for female students’
participation in athletic endeavors and the rather meager employment positions of
females in athletics. See Diane Heckman, Women and Athletics: A Twenty Year
Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 63 (1992).
4
See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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including coaches.5 The term “glass sneaker” reflects that, while
impressive strides have been made for female students since Title
IX’s inception thirty years ago, females are still imbued with the
attitude that athletic employment, participation opportunities, and
benefits are a gift and not an entitlement.
The Title IX statute heralds: “No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”6 In addition to the statute, there are implementing
regulations,7 a policy interpretation,8 and myriad other official
documents9 governing this area. To prove a prima facie Title IX
case, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) an educational program
or activity is involved;10 (2) the defendant entity is a recipient of
federal funds;11 and (3) discrimination occurred on the basis of sex
in the provision or non-provision of the educational program or

5

See infra Part III.B.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
7
Department of Education [DOE] Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education
Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance [hereinafter Title IX
Regulations], 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (2002) (originally promulgated by the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare).
8
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics [hereinafter Policy Interpretation], 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11,
1979).
9
See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS [OCR], TITLE IX
INVESTIGATOR’S ATHLETICS MANUAL (1990); OCR, Clarification of Intercollegiate
Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three Part Test (1996), http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/
docs/clarific.html.
10
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). See also Sternberg v. U.S.A. Nat’l Karate-Do Fed’n, 123 F.
Supp. 2d 659 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (deciding whether an Olympic program constituted an
educational program); Diane Heckman, Title IX Tapestry: Threshold and Procedural
Issues, 153 EDUC. L. REP. 849, 855–56 (2001) (addressing, in detail, recent case law
concerning Title IX threshold procedural issues, including whether an “educational”
program or activity was involved).
11
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). See also Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259,
20 U.S.C. § 1688 (2000) (legislatively overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S.
555 (1984) (utilizing a narrow definition of whether a program or activity had received
federal funds)); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999) (holding
that the National Collegiate Athletic Association [NCAA] was not subject to Title IX
jurisdiction due to its receipt of contributions from member colleges and universities,
who had received federal funds); Heckman, supra note 10, at 854–55 (discussing Smith).
6
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activities.12 The statute did not enunciate whether an individual
could assert a private Title IX cause of action,13 whether section
1983 causes of action14 are preempted by Title IX,15 or which
statute of limitations should be used.16 There have been no
legislative changes to alleviate these concerns, resulting in
extensive litigation.17 Many of the issues, especially the awarding
12

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (allowing a private
right of action in a sexual harassment case involving peer sexual harassment); Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (sanctioning a private right of action in
a sexual harassment case involving a teacher and student); Heckman, supra note 10, at
852–53.
14
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). This statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or the proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
15
Compare Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 163 F.3d 749 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that Title IX does subsume a § 1983 cause of action), and Waid v. Merrill Area
Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title IX does subsume a Section
1983 cause of action), with Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that both can coexist), and Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that both can coexist). See also Norris v. Norwalk Pub. Schs., 124 F.
Supp. 2d 791 (D. Conn. 2000) (concluding that Title IX does subsume a § 1983 action);
Heckman, supra note 10, at 860–61.
16
See Doe v. Howe Military Sch., 227 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the
female plaintiff did not commence her lawsuit within two years of her turning eighteen
(the age of majority) in this jurisdiction); Heckman, supra note 10, at 862–64. Other
issues such as proper party plaintiffs and defendants have also arisen. See, e.g., Morgan v.
City of New York, 166 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that a mother does not have
a Title IX cause of action for sex discrimination concerning benefits denied to her
daughter in the Choir Academy of Harlem but granted to the nationally known Boys
Choir of Harlem, Inc.); Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 80 F. Supp.
2d 729, 743 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (“Individuals who exercise administrative control over an
entity which is subject to Title IX liability may be sued in their official capacity. . . . This
is because official capacity suits represent another way of pleading an action against the
entity represented by the individuals.”). But see Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th
Cir. 1999) (holding that a school superintendent was entitled to qualified immunity in a
student’s claim of sexual harassment based on her complaint of sexual abuse by a
teacher); Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 127 F. Supp. 2d 333 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
that Title IX legislation is aimed at redressing sex discrimination against the educational
institution, rather than the individual). See Heckman, supra note 10, at 862–64.
17
See Heckman, supra note 10.
13
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of monetary damages,18 and whether those damages should be
compensatory19 or punitive,20 remain unsettled.
Shadowing the federal statute is the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause,21 since classifications are being made
based on the gender of individuals. In United States v. Virginia,22
the Supreme Court determined that the Virginia Military Institute
(VMI), a public single-sex military school, which had a Title IX
statutory exemption, violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause because VMI specifically
18

See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (holding that
monetary damages were permissible when intentional discrimination was proven);
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285–86 (calling into question whether Title IX should allow for
unlimited monetary damages since Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) [hereinafter Title VII], another federal statute prohibiting sex
discrimination in employment, had a cap of $300,000); Grandson v. Univ. of Minn., 272
F.3d 568, 571 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that proof of prior notice to the university is
required to recover monetary damages), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002); Horner v.
Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2000) (directing that proof of
intentional discrimination is required to obtain monetary damages); Doe v. Univ. of Ill.,
138 F.3d 653, 678 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Although Franklin holds that there is an implied
private right of action for damages to enforce Title IX, . . . it does not command the
inferior courts to award damages in problematic cases before school districts know what
is expected of them.”) (citation omitted); Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, Inc., 144 F.
Supp. 2d 526 (W.D. Va. 2001) (granting each of the named female student-plaintiffs
$17,000 in damages for failure to properly align female teams in the appropriate season);
Angela Vicari, Title IX Victory in Virginia, WOMEN’S SPORTS EXPERIENCE, Sept./Oct.
2000, at 15 (discussing the Alston jury award); infra text accompanying notes 106–119,
127.
19
See Heckman, supra note 10, at 866–67.
20
On November 15, 2002, the Fourth Circuit ruled, in Mercer v. Duke University, 50
Fed. Appx. 643 (4th Cir. 2002), that punitive damages were not available against a
private university in a case where the jury awarded a female student $2 million in
punitive damages. See also infra text accompanying note 65. For earlier cases discussing
punitive damages, see, e.g., Landon v. Oswego Unit Sch. Dist. # 308, 143 F. Supp. 2d
1011 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (disallowing punitive damages in a Title IX lawsuit against a local
school board); Doe v. Oyster River Coop. Sch. Dist., 992 F. Supp. 467 (D.N.H. 1997)
(allowing punitive damages); Collier v. William Penn Sch. Dist., 956 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D.
Pa. 1997) (finding that punitive damages cannot be recovered against a school district).
21
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). See also Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 690–91 (1973).
22
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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excluded female students. The case is notable since the Court
embraced pivotal language utilizing the intermediate standard in
addressing equal protection claims based on sex discrimination.23
The next issue on the horizon is whether an individual may assert a
Title IX cause of action against a state entity or state actor without
abridging the Eleventh Amendment.24
Title IX celebrated its silver anniversary on June 23, 1997.25
During the first twenty-five years of Title IX, the Supreme Court
confined itself to only four substantive decisions. In this
introductory period, the Court rendered decisions in Cannon v.
University of Chicago,26 holding there is a private right of action to

23

Id. at 531–33 (“Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must
demonstrate an ‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for that action. . . . Focusing on the
differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing
court must determine whether the proffered justification is ‘exceedingly persuasive.’ The
burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State. . . . The
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.”).
24
The Eleventh Amendment protects the sovereign immunity of states and would bar
equitable as well as monetary relief from the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See also
Morris v. Wallace Cmty. Coll.-Selma, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1335 (S.D. Ala. 2001)
(“Whether an entity other than the state itself partakes of the state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity depends on whether it is an ‘arm of the state.’”), aff’d, 34 Fed. Appx. 388 (11th
Cir. 2002). Factors to determine whether an entity is an arm of the state include: the
definitions of “state” and “political subdivision,” the state’s degree of control over the
entity, and the fiscal autonomy of the entity, which may include what entity would be
responsible for paying judgments against the sued entity. Id. See also Civil Rights
Remedies Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1)(1994) (expressly abrogating
Eleventh Amendment immunity for states in a Title IX action). Congress has the
authority, under its Spending Clause power, to eliminate state sovereign immunity in this
fashion. See, e.g., Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000); Horner v.
Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 2000); Litman v. George
Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir.
1997); Heckman, note 10, at 856–60.
25
See Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five Year
History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletics, 7 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 391 (1997).
26
441 U.S. 677 (1979). See also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279–80 (2001)
(“In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Court held that a private right of action existed
to enforce Title IX . . . .”) (citation omitted); Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S.
186, 231 (1996) (“Our holding in Cannon, that Title IX . . . created a private right of
action for victims of discrimination in education, relied heavily on the fact that during the
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enforce this law; North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,27
upholding the validity of certain Title IX regulations; Grove City
College v. Bell,28 holding that even if an educational program does
not directly receive federal funds, Title IX still applies; and
Franklin v. Gwinett County Public Schools,29 articulating that
monetary damages may be available in a Title IX lawsuit when
intentional discrimination is established. The subsequent influx of
Title IX lawsuits can be traced to this last decision. Since 1997,
the Supreme Court has issued three new Title IX decisions, which
examined student sexual harassment actions against educational
institutions due to actions of teachers,30
reviewed sexual
harassment actions against educational institutions involving peer
sexual harassment,31 and explored Title IX’s scope, specifically
whether the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is
included.32 Parties have been appealing Title IX cases to the
Supreme Court in record numbers.33
1960s the Court had consistently found such remedies notwithstanding the absence of an
express direction from Congress.”).
27
456 U.S. 512 (1982).
28
465 U.S. 555 (1984).
29
503 U.S. 60 (1992). See also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 196 (1996) (“In Franklin,
we held only that the implied private right of action under Title IX . . . supports a claim
for monetary damages.”); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994) (“[W]e
held in Franklin that the right of action under Title IX . . . included a claim for
damages.’).
30
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
31
Davis v. Monroe County, Ga. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
32
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). See also Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (holding that a state
high school athletic association is within Title IX’s scope).
Nor do we think there is anything to be said for the Association’s contention
that there is no need to treat it as a state actor since any public school applying
the Association’s rules is itself subject to suit under § 1983 or Title IX. If
Brentwood’s claim were pushing at the edge of the class of possible defendant
state actors, an argument about the social utility of expanding that class would
at least be on point, but because we are nowhere near the margin in this case,
the Association is really asking for nothing less than a dispensation for itself.
Id. at 304–05 (citation omitted).
33
See, e.g., Grandson v. Univ. of Minnesota, 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2001) (equal
opportunity: female student-athletes), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002); Doe v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2000) (sexual harassment: teacher-student), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1073 (2001); Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir.
1999) (equal opportunity: male and female student-athletes), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1284
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This Article, while addressing seminal decisions of the past
thirty years, concentrates on recent decisions, and is divided into
three major topics. Part I examines the governing regulations.
Part II discusses equal opportunity on behalf of student-athletes.
Part III explores sex discrimination in educational employment,
and, specifically, the unresolved issue of whether Title IX affords a
separate cause of action to safeguard against sex discrimination
vis-à-vis utilizing other federal anti-discrimination statutes.34

(2000); Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch., 163 F.3d 749 (sexual harassment: studentstudent), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1145 (1999); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d
544 (4th Cir. 1999) (sexual harassment related), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000);
Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999) (employment: termination of
female women’s head basketball coach), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022 (1999); Floyd v.
Waiters, 171 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 1999) (sexual harassment), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 891
(1999); Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schs. McCaffrey, 122 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 1998)
(sexual harassment: teacher-student and student-student), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154
(1999); Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist., Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997)
(sexual harassment: teacher-student), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 951 (1998); N. Lawrence
Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Mary M., 131 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir. 1997) (sexual harassment: teacherstudent), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998); O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir.
1997) (sexual harassment), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1114 (1998); Rowinsky v. Bryan
Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment: student-student), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 861 (1996); Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271 (8th Cir. 1996)
(education employees generally: termination of dental hygienist program at the
university), cert. denied sub nom. Brine v. Iowa Bd. of Regents, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997);
Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment:
university policy), cert. denied sub nom. Beeman v. Cohen, 520 U.S. 1140 (1997);
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (equal opportunity on behalf of
female student-athletes), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment: teacher-student), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1265 (1997); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995) (education
employees generally: termination), cert. denied sub nom. Lakoski v. Univ. of Tex., Med.
Branch at Galveston, 519 U.S. 947 (1996); El-Attar v. Miss. State Univ., 68 F.3d 468
(5th Cir. 1995) (education programs generally), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1094 (1996);
Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995) (sexual
harassment: outside organization’s presentation to students), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159
(1996); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (sexual harassment:
teacher-student), cert. denied sub nom. Lankford v. Doe, 513 U.S. 815 (1994); Kelley v.
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994) (equal opportunity: male
student-athletes), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995); Roberts v. Col. State Bd. of Agric.,
998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993) (equal opportunity: female student-athletes), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Williams v. Bethlehem Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993)
(athletics: cross-over case), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994).
34
See Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title IX’s 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination
in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545 (1997). Neither the Title IX statute nor
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I.
TITLE IX GENERAL APPLICATION REGULATIONS,
INCLUDING THE GOVERNANCE OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION CLASSES
While courts have robustly addressed the constitutionality of
the Title IX regulations in the past,35 there has been no new case
law within the past decade. There have been no changes to any of
the regulations since their enactment in 1975.36 A handful of
regulations set forth certain procedural items, such as the
designation of a Title IX coordinator;37 the publishing of a Title IX
notice;38 and the adoption and publishing of grievance procedures
to handle Title IX complaints internally within the educational
institution.39
In the past thirty years, there have been no major decisions
addressing traditional educational curriculum.40
There are
implementing regulations refer explicitly to sexual harassment, although the courts have
implied its application within Title IX’s coverage. This Article will not address Title IX
sexual harassment.
35
Title IX Regulations, 34 C.F.R. pt. 106 (2002). See also N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v.
Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (finding regulations involving educational employment were
constitutional); Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Ohio High Sch. Ass’n, 443
F. Supp. 753, 759 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (finding the regulations violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment), rev’d, 647 F.2d 651 (6th Cir. 1981); Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425 (D. Kan. 1978) (providing the first
challenge to the new regulations brought by the NCAA, which originally only covered
male intercollegiate athletes), rev’d, 622 F.2d 1282 (10th Cir. 1980); Leffel v. Wis.
Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (providing the only
decision not reversed on appeal to find any of the Title IX regulations were
unconstitutional in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
36
34 C.F.R. pt. 106. It remains to be seen, however, whether there will be changes as a
result of the 2003 Department of Education’s Commission on Opportunity in Athletics
report. See infra notes 43–44.
37
See id. § 106.8; Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639 (1999)
(disregarding the female student’s argument that the school board had not provided its
employees with instruction to eradicate peer sexual harassment); Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 291–92 (1998) (noting that the failure to comply with the
Title IX regulations did not automatically equate with a substantive violation of Title IX);
Heckman, supra note 10, at 852–53.
38
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.9.
39
See id. § 106.8. See, e.g., Kracunas v. Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“Although [the college] maintained a sexual harassment policy that complied with the
requirements of 34 C.F.R. § 106.8, the mere existence of reasonable complaint
procedures does not insulate [the college] from liability for sexual harassment claims.”).
40
See, e.g., Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995)
(affirming district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s Title IX sexual harassment action for
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regulations pertaining to the conduct of physical education
classes;41 however, they have yielded no case law addressing the
composition or administration of physical education classes.
On the administrative front, the Department of Education’s
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) oversees Title IX cases.
Historically, the OCR has maintained a low profile in advocating
Title IX. Preceding Assistant Secretaries include: Clarence
Thomas (Reagan Administration), now an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court; Michael Thomas (George Bush Administration);
and Norma Cantu (Clinton Administration).
During 2001,
President George W. Bush nominated Gerald A. Reynolds for
Assistant Secretary of the OCR and appointed him to the position
in March 2002.42 On June 27, 2002 (four days after the thirtieth
anniversary of Title IX), Secretary Roderick R. Paige announced
the formation of a fifteen-person “Commission on Opportunity in
Athletics” to study Title IX and its application to athletics and

failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted); Pfeiffer v. Sch. Bd. for Marion
Ctr. Area, 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming district court’s finding that plaintiff
was denied access to NHS for engaging in premarital sex, not because of her pregnancy,
and, therefore, Title IX did not provide relief); Darian v. Univ. of Mass. at Boston, 980 F.
Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 2000) (denying a pregnant nursing student’s claim that she was
subject to Title IX discrimination where she alleged her difficult pregnancy interfered
with her courses); Middlebrooks v. Univ. of Md. at Coll. Park, 980 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md.
1997) (holding that a female student terminated from a doctorate program, after failing to
pass a minimum number of qualifying tests, did not establish a prima facie Title IX case),
aff’d, 166 F.3d 1209 (4th Cir. 1999); Hall v. Lee Coll., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D.
Tenn. 1996) (ruling there was no violation of Title IX where a female coed was
suspended for violating this private college’s policy prohibiting pre-marital sex, absent
evidence that males would not have been similarly suspended); Ivan v. Kent State Univ.,
863 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (granting summary judgment against a plaintiff
claiming Kent State discriminated against her by issuing her a grade of incomplete after
she became pregnant), aff’d, 92 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. 1996); Andriakos v. Univ. of S. Ind.,
867 F. Supp. 804 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (granting summary judgment against a male plaintiff’s
Title IX claim of sex discrimination by a nursing school professor), aff’d, 19 F.3d 21 (7th
Cir. 1994); Heckman, supra note 34, at 552–55 (elaborating on these decisions).
41
34 C.F.R. § 106.31–.34. The regulations permit gender segregated physical
education classes when the activity involves a contact sport. Id. § 106.34. This tracks the
language found in Title IX regulations governing extracurricular athletic activities that
allows separate teams. See id. § 106.41(b).
42
DOE, Reynolds to Direct the Office for Civil Rights (June 25, 2001), http://www.ed.
gov/PressReleases/06-2001/06252001a.html.
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directed the release of a report by January 31, 2003.43 The reason
for the compressed timeframe is unknown. Public hearings were
held in Atlanta, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Colorado Springs,
Colorado and San Diego, California. The commission’s nonbinding report was issued on February 28, 2003.44
II.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ON BEHALF OF STUDENT-ATHLETES

Title IX has become synonymous with expanding participation
opportunities for female student-athletes.45 While there is no
constitutional requirement that any educational institution provide
extracurricular athletic opportunities, Fourteenth Amendment and
Title IX concerns may arise when separate athletic programs are
provided for males and females. The two main issues pertaining to
student-athletes and prospective student-athletes are: (1) whether
43

See Mike Allen & Valerie Strauss, Panel Named To Study Title IX; Law’s Fairness
To Be Examined, WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at A27; Michael Dobie, Entitlement?,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 24, 2002, at B16–19; Charles McGrath, The Way We Live Now:
9/15/02: A Whole New Ballgame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, § 6, at 21–22; DOE,
Secretary’s Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, at http://www.ed.gov/inits/
commisionsboards/athletics/index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2003) (providing transcripts
of the town meetings). Remarkably, the commission was not directed toward
interscholastic athletics.
44
COMM’N ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS, “OPEN TO ALL”: TITLE IX AT THIRTY
(2003), http://www.ed.gov/pubs/titleixat30/title9_report.pdf. Two members of the
commission, Julie Foudy and Donna de Varona, issued a minority report. MINORITY
VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS (2003),
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/binary-data/WSF_ARTICLE/pdf_file/944.pdf.
Secretary of Education Rod Paige made a statement indicating that the Department of
Education would only move forward on recommendations unanimously approved by the
commission. Press Release, DOE, Paige Issues Statement Regarding Final Report of
Commission on Opportunity in Athletics (Feb. 26, 2003), http://www.ed.gov/
PressReleases/02-2003/02262003a.html.
45
The phenomenal attendance records at the 1999 World Cup, which the United States
women’s soccer team—composed of former collegiate players—won, was an outgrowth
of Title IX. See Jeannine Guttman, Covering Women’s Sports Better, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, April 23, 2000, at 1C (noting that the game broke “all attendance records for
women’s sports and [set] TV viewership records”). Cf. Neal v. Bd. Trs. Cal. State Univs.,
198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 2000) (“And the victorious athletes understood as well as
anyone the connection between a 27-year-old statute and tangible progress in women’s
athletics.”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 188 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Title IX has
changed the face of women’s sports as well as our society’s interest in and attitude
toward women athletes and women’s sports.”).
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equal opportunity must be provided when separate teams are
provided for males and females, and if so, what constitutes equal
opportunity; and (2) whether students of one sex must be permitted
to try-out and participate on the other sex’s team (“cross-over”) if
only one team is offered. Two Title IX regulations deal with
athletics, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (athletics generally),46 and 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.37(c) (distribution of athlete scholarships).47 One circuit
court explained, “The drafters of these regulations recognized a
situation that Congress well understood: Male athletes had been
given an enormous head start in the race against their female
counterparts for athletic resources, and Title IX would prompt
universities to level the proverbial playing field.”48 The regulation
governing “athletics generally” was the most frequently attacked of
all the Title IX regulations during the last decade. The statistics
for male and female NCAA students at Division I member schools
are 47% male students and 53% female students; compared to 59%
male student-athletes and 41% female student-athletes, which
represents the highest percentage ever reported for this category;
and the corresponding figures of 57% of athletic scholarships for
male student-athletes compared to 43% of athletic scholarships for
female student-athletes.49

46

See Heckman, supra note 25, at 397–400.
See infra Part II.C.
48
Neal, 198 F.3d at 767.
49
See 1999–00 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT 9 (2002), http://www.ncaa.org/
library/research/gender_equity_study/1999-00/1999-00_gender_equity_report.pdf; id. tbl.
7, at 20. The study provides detailed information as to the respective divisions: Divisions
I, II and III, with a further breakdown of the subdivisions within Division I (Division I-A,
which contains the highest profile national collegiate athletic programs; Division I-AA;
and Division I-AAA). While the study provides overall statistics for the percentage of
students overall, it does not present the corresponding overall percentage of NCAA
student-athletes, as opposed to the figures for the respective divisions. In Division I, for
males, the average operating expenses equated to $882,100 (64%); for females, the
average operating expenses equated to $486,200 (36%). Id. In Division I, for males the
average recruiting expenses equated to $184,200 (68%); for females, the average
recruiting expenses equated to $85,900 (32%). Id. See also infra note 168 for the average
expenditures for athletic scholarships.
47
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A. Cross-Over Cases
The term “cross-over case” is commonly used to describe a
case when an individual of one sex competes or wants to compete
on an athletic team consisting of members of the other sex. The
Title IX regulations permit the operation of separate sex teams in
certain situations, specifically when participation is based on
competitive skill or when the team competes in a “contact” sport.50
The latter was one of the primary issues litigated during the first
twenty-five years of Title IX’s existence on the interscholastic
level. The regulations allow for separate teams or preclusion of
one sex from participating on the team composed of members of
the other sex when the sport is a contact sport.51 Contrast this with
New York, which has issued state regulations pertaining to
interscholastic athletics for grades seven through twelve,
conditionally allowing females to participate on all-boys teams
regardless of whether a female team is offered or not offered.52
50

34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2002).
a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from
another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a
recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on
such basis.
b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of
this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for
members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon
competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However,
where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for
members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members
of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have
previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed
to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact
sport. For purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing,
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other sports the
purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.
Id. § 106.41(a)–(b). See also Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 693
(6th Cir. 2000) (“All [Title IX] and the implementing regulations require is equality of
athletic opportunity. The statute does not require gender balance. Further, in certain
instances, separate teams for males and females are allowed.”) (citing Title IX and 34
C.F.R. § 106.41(b)).
51
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b).
52
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 135.4(c)(7)(ii)(c) (2003). A review panel
rules on the student’s “fitness” to participate in mixed competition for certain sports
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In recent years, there continues to be little judicial action
involving cross-over cases.53 In Barnett v. Texas Wrestling
Ass’n,54 female members of two high school varsity coed wrestling
teams were banned from competing against male wrestlers by the
state interscholastic wrestling association.55 The district court
ruled that there was no liability based on the Title IX regulation, 34
C.F.R. § 106.41(b), which clearly identifies wrestling as a “[t]he
quintessential contact sport.”56 Nonetheless, the females’ request
for injunctive relief was granted predicated on violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.
If a sport was deemed a contact sport, then the presumption
under the regulations was that the other sex may be legally
excluded from participation. In Mercer v. Duke University,57 a
female place kicker alleged sex discrimination when she was not
selected for the football team, one of the specifically enumerated
contact sports in the Title IX regulations.58 The parties did not
(which goes beyond Title IX’s enumerated “contact” sports). The review panel consists
of the school physician and a physical education teacher appointed by the principal and,
if desired, a physician appointed by the student. Decisions will be based on majority
vote. Id. § 135.4(c)(7)(ii)(c)(2). The identified sports are baseball, basketball, boxing,
wrestling, field hockey, football, ice hockey, lacrosse, rugby, soccer, softball, speedball,
team hand ball, and power volleyball (where the height of the net is set at less than eight
feet). Id. While the fitness criteria is another barrier to female participation, female
student-athletes are beginning to participate on these teams in New York, and cannot be
automatically excluded as a student can under Title IX. Where separate teams are offered
for males and females, then females may participate on all-male teams; however, males
may be prohibited from being on all-female teams. Id. § 135.4(c)(7)(ii)(c)(3). When only
one team is provided in a particular sport, females may participate on all-male teams;
however, males may be prohibited “upon a finding that such participation would have a
significant adverse effect.” Id. § 135.4(c)(7)(ii)(c)(4).
53
See Heckman, supra note 25, at 398 n.34 (listing cross-over decisions involving both
females and males).
54
16 F. Supp. 2d 690 (N.D. Tex. 1998). See also Adams v. Baker, 919 F. Supp. 1496
(D. Kan. 1996).
55
Barnett, 16 F. Supp. at 692.
56
Id. at 694–95.
57
32 F. Supp. 2d 836 (M.D.N.C. 1998), rev’d, 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999). Heather
Sue Mercer reportedly did not want to sue Duke, but only wanted an apology. During
August 2001, Ashley Martin would go on to become the first female to score a point in a
Division I football game, where she kicked two extra points for Jacksonville State
University, located in Alabama. See Assoc. Press, Female Kicker Breaks Gender Barrier,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001, § D, at 6, col. 1.
58
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2002).
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contest that football at the university was a coed team, although no
females had ever participated on the team. The North Carolina
district court granted the university’s motion for summary
judgment, determining that the regulation did not contain an
exception for any particular position that may not require physical
contact.59 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court unanimously
reversed the district court’s determination reinstating the case.60 It
reviewed the “separate teams” subsection and noted that Duke
University had allowed this female to try-out for a decidedly coed
contact sport team. The Fourth Circuit recognized that subsection
(a) and subsection (b) of the regulation “stand in a symbiotic
relationship to one another.”61
We therefore construe the second sentence of subsection
(b) as providing that in non-contact sports, but not in
contact sports, covered institutions must allow members of
an excluded sex to try out for single-sex teams. Once an
institution has allowed a member of one sex to try out for a
team operated by the institution for the other sex in a
contact sports, subsection (b) is simply no longer
applicable, and the institution is subject to the general antidiscrimination provision of subsection (a).62
On remand, the eight-person North Carolina jury awarded
Mercer $1 in compensatory damages and $2 million in punitive
damages.63 The verdict represents the first case awarding punitive
damages in a Title IX athletics-related case. During 2001, the
North Carolina district court judge rejected the university’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law.64 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit

59

Mercer, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 840. Although football rules insulate a place kicker from
direct contact, incidental contact may occur.
60
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 190 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 1999).
61
Id. at 646.
62
Id. at 647–48 (emphasis supplied). “Where, as here, however, the university invites
women into what appellees characterize as the ‘traditionally all-male bastion of collegiate
football,’ . . . we are convinced that this reading of the regulation is the only one
permissible under law.” Id. at 648.
63
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525, 535 (M.D.N.C. 2001), vacated in part
by 50 Fed. Appx. 643 (4th Cir. 2002).
64
Id. at 525.
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ruled recently that punitive damages were not recoverable in a
Title IX action.65
B. Equal Opportunity
Another subdivision of the Title IX regulations, 34 C.F.R. §
106.41(c), mandates “equal opportunity”66 in the provision of
interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic programs where separate
programs are provided for males and females based on the first
enumerated program area listed.67 Remarkably, despite the
65

Mercer, 50 Fed. Appx. at 643. The Fourth Circuit reached its conclusion based on
an intervening Supreme Court decision in Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002)
(concluding that punitive damages were not available in private causes of action seeking
redress based on two federal civil rights laws prohibiting disability discrimination which
relied on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter Title VI]). The Fourth
Circuit noted that Title IX was predicated upon Title VI; thus, the court reached the same
conclusion for a Title IX action. Mercer, 50 Fed. Appx. at 643.
66
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2002).
c) Equal Opportunity. A recipient that operates or sponsors interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal
opportunities are available the Director will consider, among other factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members
of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors
separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the
Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for
teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each
sex.
Id.
67
See Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Action in Intercollegiate
Athletics During 1992–93: Defining the “Equal Opportunity” Standard, 1994 DETROIT
C. L. REV. 953 (discussing in-depth the quartet of significant equal opportunity cases all
commenced by female student-athletes: Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.
1996); Roberts v. Colo. State Univ., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993); and Favia v. Univ. of
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passage of thirty years, the legal discourse has centered almost
exclusively on the first program area delineated.
1. Female Olympic Athletes
In a fascinating case of first impression, a New York federal
district court ruled, in Sternberg v. U.S.A. National Karate-Do
Federation,68 that Title IX applies to American Olympic athletes
involved with the Karate-Do Federation, a national governing
body. The court found that an educational program or activity was
involved and that the defendant was a recipient of federal funds.69
The Karate-Do Federation did not receive any direct federal
funding, however, in 1999 the United States Olympic Committee
provided over $40 million to all national governing bodies,
including the Karate-Do Federation.70
2. Female Student-Athletes
During the early 1990s, females struggled to obtain or maintain
sports teams.71 The battle over when female varsity teams must be
retained or club teams elevated to varsity status was fought on the
intercollegiate level. The inquiry into the appropriate benefits and
conditions afforded to female sports teams has recently begun
judicial exploration in the interscholastic arena.72
Ind. at Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737
(N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993)). The First Circuit decision in the
Cohen case—addressing the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the University
and expounding on a permanent injunction issued against the University—has emerged
as the bellwether decision in the past thirty years on the issue of providing equal
opportunity to student-athletes. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 155.
68
123 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
69
See id. at 662.
70
See id. at 663.
71
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Title IX has enhanced, and will continue to enhance, women’s opportunities to enjoy
the thrill of victory, the agony of defeat, and the many tangible benefits that flow from
just being given a chance to participate in intercollegiate athletics.”); Sternberg, 123 F.
Supp. 2d at 663; Heckman, supra note 67, at 966–94.
72
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)–(10) (2002). Gender equity is still woefully lacking in
media coverage, whether it is television, print, or radio broadcasting. See infra note 147
(regarding the CBS contract with the NCAA to televise the men’s Division I basketball
tournament (without also broadcasting the women’s basketball tournament)). Rarely are
women featured on the back pages of the sports coverage in newspapers, and most papers
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a) Intercollegiate Athletics
The two pivotal actions during the last few years in this area73
were the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Cohen v. Brown
University,74 the leading case in the area of athletics equal
opportunity, and decision in National College Athletic Ass’n v.
Smith.75 The Cohen case, originally commenced during 1992, was
brought by female student-athletes on the women’s varsity
report male teams’ scores without any gender identification, e.g., “Maryland beats
Indiana,” whereas the female teams are specifically identified as the “girls” basketball
team. Sports Illustrated has historically been dismal when it comes to featuring female
athletes on the cover of this magazine; instead, it continues to vamp its “swimsuit issue”
with a female model (routinely not even a female athlete) on its cover. During 1999, a
new magazine was launched, Sports Illustrated for Women. See Keith L. Alexander,
“Women’s Sports” Folds as Niche Gets Redefined, USA TODAY, July 3, 2000, at 8B. The
magazine is now defunct. See David Carr, Time Inc.’s Closing Sports Illustrated for
Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, § C, at 7. Female sportscasters for men’s athletic
events and even on the nightly news sports section also remain in small supply. It was
not until 1987 that Gayle Sierens became the first woman to do play-by-play in a NFL
game, see Tom Weir, 20th Century: This Day in Sports, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 1999, at
3C; in 1996, Robin Roberts became the first woman to anchor a network NFL studio
show. Donna Lopiano, The Year of the Woman in Sports, SPORTING NEWS, Dec. 30, 1996.
See also infra notes 195–203 concerning the lack of progress for female employees in
NCAA intercollegiate programs.
73
See Martha Ackmann, Years Later, Maker of a Landmark Film Still Stands Up for
Title IX, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2000, § 8, col. 1, at 11 (addressing the documentary, A
Hero for Daisy, about the struggles of the women’s crew team at Yale University);
Heckman, supra note 25, at 420 n.142 (identifying applicable cases).
74
520 U.S. 1186 (1997), denying cert. to 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming the
district court’s granting of a permanent injunction in favor of the female student-athletes,
but remanding on the lower court’s compliance plan, so as to allow the University to
posit a satisfactory one). See also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993)
(trial seeking reinstitution of two women’s varsity teams that began on September 26,
1994; case partially settled on September 28, 1994); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp.
185 (D.R.I. 1995) (ruling that the university violated Title IX and ordering the defendant
to submit a compliance plan within 120 days, but staying the directive pending an
appeal), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996); Heckman, supra
note 34, at 565 n.103) (explaining this ruling). The district court judge modified his
March 29, 1995 judgment, Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 185, in the following respects:
reducing the time to submit a compliance plan from 120 to 60 days and eliminating the
provision which allowed for a stay pending the appeal. The University appealed the
modified order. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Cohen, 101 F.3d
155 (1st Cir. 1996). See also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992),
aff’d, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court’s granting of the
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction retaining the two women’s varsity teams).
75
525 U.S. 459 (1998).
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gymnastics and volleyball teams seeking to forestall the
elimination of their teams.76 On June 23, 1998, the parties settled
the Cohen case, subject to court approval,77 which was granted.
The settlement required Brown University to provide athletic
opportunities for females in close proportion to the percentage of
female students (within a 3.5% range).78
In Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,79 Renee M.
Smith, a female graduate student who still had NCAA eligibility,
wanted to play on her graduate schools’ volleyball teams. She had
the two graduate schools (Hofstra University and University of
Pittsburgh School of Law) seek waivers from the NCAA, which
had a rule that the individual must play at the same institution as
the student’s undergraduate institution. The NCAA denied the
waivers for her continued athletic eligibility. Smith contended that
the rejected waiver requests resulted in sex discrimination by the
NCAA pursuant to Title IX, as allegedly more male studentathletes were afforded waivers than female student-athletes; and
secondly, that the NCAA violated the Sherman Act.80
76

Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 978.
See Joint Agreement, Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) (No.
92-CV-197), aff’d, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), http://www.tlpj.org/briefs/010Cohen.pdf. The agreement called for the retention of thirteen varsity women’s teams as
university-funded teams for the academic years 1998–99 through 2000–01. See id. § II.B,
at 4–5. While volleyball was one of the included teams, gymnastics was relegated to a
donor-funded team. See id. § II.B, D, at 4–5. Moreover, the percentage of female
students to female student-athletes must be within 3.5% in each academic year from
1998–99 through 2000–01. See id. § III.A.1, at 6–7.
78
See id. § III.A.1, at 6–7. To date, there is no court decision expounding on the
minimum differential that the judiciary will accept to satisfy Title IX’s substantial
proportionality requirement.
79
139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), rev’d, 525 U.S. 459 (1999).
80
Id. at 182 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)). The Third Circuit held the NCAA’s
“[e]ligibility rules are not related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities . . .
[thus] the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of eligibility
requirements.” Id. at 185. In 1991, the NCAA instituted a rule aimed at cost-cutting that
restricted earnings for certain assistant coaches to $12,000 during the school year and
$4,000 during the summer. A group of the affected coaches instituted a successful
lawsuit against the NCAA based on violation of the Sherman Act. The parties settled the
suit in March of 1999 for $54.5 million. Associated Press, NCAA Settles Suit for $54.5
Million, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), March 10, 1999, at A76. The Association of Intercollegiate
Athletics for Women, the former governing body of women’s collegiate athletics,
brought a lawsuit against the NCAA unsuccessfully alleging violation of the Sherman
Act. Ass’n for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
77

5 - HECKMAN FORMAT

570

4/15/03 9:51 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 551

Procedurally, the defendant-NCAA sought a motion to dismiss the
original complaint brought by the pro se plaintiff, which the
district court granted.81 Smith (this time with counsel) sought
appellate review. The Third Circuit held that the NCAA would be
governed by Title IX because it collected dues from its member
colleges and universities, which received federal funds.82
Nonetheless, the court affirmed the lower court’s holding that the
NCAA rule was not in restraint of trade in violation of the antitrust
statutes.83 A month after oral argument, the Supreme Court
quickly and unanimously disposed of the appeal, reversing the
appellate court on the issue of whether the NCAA was a recipient
of federal funds,84 and remanded for further consideration.
In Pederson v. Louisiana State University,85 the Louisiana
district court had the opportunity to hear a case where the female
plaintiffs sought elevation of two club teams, soccer and softball,
to varsity status. The district court found the university had
558 F. Supp. 487 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 735 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Bowers
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 497–98 (D.N.J. 1998) (dismissing a
female learning-disabled student’s claim against the NCAA for violation of the Sherman
Act).
81
Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 978 F. Supp. 213, 220 (W.D. Pa. 1997),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and vated in part by 139 F. 3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998), vacated by
525 U.S. 459 (1999). The plaintiff also moved to amend her complaint, which the district
court denied. Id. at 221.
82
Smith, 139 F.3d at 187. Generally, athletic associations have been buffered from
Title IX jurisdiction, as the associations did not directly receive federal funds. See
Heckman, supra note 3, at 35 n.157. But see Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No.
C-92-CV-295 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 1993), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 43 F.3d 265, 272
(6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the state interscholastic athletic association was subject to
Title IX). See also Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d
1001, 1008 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (concluding that whether this state high school athletic
association was a recipient of federal funds was a question of fact).
83
Smith, 139 F.3d at 187.
84
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). The inquiry was
whether funds the NCAA received for its National Youth Sports Program would be
sufficient to trigger Title IX jurisdiction. Id. at 469–70. The Court noted, “[u]nlike the
earmarked student aid in Grove City, there is no allegation that NCAA members paid
their dues with federal funds earmarked for that purpose.” Id. at 468. See also Cureton v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999) (concerning whether the
NCAA received federal funds to garner Title VI jurisdiction).
85
912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996) (finding that the University violated Title IX, and
ordering submission of a compliance action plan), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and
vacated in part by 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
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violated Title IX.86 Subsequently, on March 4, 1997, the court
denied the state university’s motion to dismiss,87 which it had
raised based on the intervening Supreme Court decision in the
Seminole Tribe case.88 During May 1997, the district court finally
accepted a university-proposed compliance plan.89 On July 1,
1997, the court entered final judgment in this case.90 In
determining whether the selection of sports, identified in the first
program area, was satisfied, the court referenced the three-part
“effective accommodation test” found in the 1979 Policy
Interpretation.91 The educational institution that provides separate
athletic programs for male and female student-athletes must meet
one of the three prongs found in the test. The first prong requires
86

Id. at 917.
See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 865 (5th Cir. 2000).
88
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). See also Heckman, supra note
10, at 856–57.
89
See Pederson, 213 F.3d at 865.
90
Id.
91
See id. at 879.
C. Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and Abilities.
...
5. Application of the Policy—Levels of Competition. In effectively
accommodating the interests and abilities of male and female
athletes, institutions must provide the opportunity for individuals of
each sex to participate in intercollegiate competition, and for athletes
of each sex to have competitive team schedules, which equally reflect
their abilities.
a. Compliance will be assessed in any one of the following ways:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for
male and female students are provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments;
or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether
the institution can show a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to
the developing interest and abilities of the members of that
sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a
continuing practice or program expansion such as that cited
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program.
Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
87
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substantial proportionality between the percentage of students and
the percentage of student-athletes of the same sex.92 The second
prong demands a history and continuing practice of program
expansion, while the third prong directs that the current program
fully and effectively accommodates the interests and abilities of
the underrepresented gender.93 The district court eschewed the
application of the first prong of the three-prong effective
accommodation test94 that had been sanctioned by the First, Third,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals.95 The
Fifth Circuit decision ultimately upheld the use of the entire
effective accommodation test.96
Significantly, another district court sided with the Pederson
district court in rejecting use of the first prong. The California
district court in Neal v. Board of Trustees California State
University, enunciated, “[T]he Pederson court’s rejection of the
safe harbor test, is sensible. This court essentially finds that the
safe harbor rule is not dictated by the Policy Interpretation and is
inconsistent with the text, structure and policy of Title IX itself.”97
92

See id.
See id.
94
See id; Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, and vacated in part by 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
Under the Policy Interpretation, an educational institution which is proved not
to be effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex but is able to demonstrate a history and continuing
practice of program expansion demonstrably responsive to the developing
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex may still be found to be in
compliance with Title IX.
Id. at 916.
95
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 773 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Today, we join our sister circuits in holding that Title IX does not bar universities from
taking steps to ensure that women are approximately as well represented in sports
programs as they are in student bodies.”); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.
1996); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelley v.
Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d
824 (10th Cir. 1993); Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1992); Heckman,
supra note 25, at 408 n.83.
96
Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000). The Ninth Circuit would
also condone the effective accommodation test. See Neal, 198 F.3d at 763.
97
Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., No. CV-F-97-5009, 1997 WL 1524813, at
*12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 1997), rev’d, 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Heckman,
supra note 67, at 993 (concerning the consent decree entered into by the California State
Universities).
93
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However, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit emphatically rejected this
position, noting that the Pederson district court’s rejection of the
first prong was found in the dicta. The appellate court stated:
As is explained above, those courts emphasized that
women’s interest in sports appeared to be lower than
men’s, but that the genders’ interests were slowly but
surely converging, which was precisely the reason why
requiring only that each gender’s expressed interest in
participating be accommodated equally would freeze the
inequality of the status quo.98
In Boucher v. Syracuse University,99 the district court granted
summary judgment to the defendant-university and dismissed the
Title IX claims of female student-athletes. The court found that
Syracuse University had satisfied the second prong of Title IX with
a continuing history of program expansion as the university had
current plans to add more intercollegiate athletic teams for female
students.100 This is the first court to make such an affirmative
finding. The students appealed. The Second Circuit determined
that the district court, in this class action, should have sanctioned
classes representing the female lacrosse players and softball
players.101

98

Neal, 198 F.3d at 768. Moreover, “Adopting [the university’s] interest-based test for
Title IX compliance would hinder, and quite possibly reverse, the steady increases in
women’s participation and interest in sports that have followed Title IX’s enactment.” Id.
at 769. Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded, “We adopt the reasoning of Cohen I, Cohen
II, and Kelley, and hold that the constitutional analysis contained therein persuasively
disposes of any serious constitutional concerns that might be raised in relation to the
OCR Policy Interpretation.” Id. at 772.
99
No. 95-CV-620, 1998 WL 167296 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1998) (mem.) (reviewing the
entire history of the university’s athletic programs and activities since the enactment of
Title IX), aff’d in part, dismissed as moot in part, and vacated in part by 164 F.3d 113
(2d Cir. 1999).
100
See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979) (setting out
the second prong of the effective accommodation test).
101
Boucher, 164 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 1999). The Second Circuit also directed that
since the University had agreed to sponsor a women’s varsity softball team, the order as
to forming a sub-class for the female softball players would be deemed in temporary
abeyance, awaiting the actual implementation of this team. Id.
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Both male and female student-athletes instituted the lawsuit in
Harper v. Board of Regents, Illinois State University,102 where two
female students alleged sex discrimination based on the
elimination of men’s athletic teams to achieve Title IX
proportionality rather that the addition of three more women’s
teams. The court held:
[The] two named [female] plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring a claim for failing to add a women’s Rugby team to
the ISU athletic roster under Title IX. Title IX does not
require ISU to add women’s teams, in particular Rugby
teams; it merely requires ‘equal opportunity’ for both male
and female athletes who are students.103
Thus, the court dismissed this count with prejudice.104 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s grant of the university’s
motion for summary judgment with respect to the men’s Title IX
claim.105
On March 16, 1998, the district court in Grandson v.
University of Minnesota106 denied the defendant-university’s
motion to dismiss the complaint in an action brought concerning
allegations of discriminatory funding of the women’s soccer team,
including the lack of an athletic scholarship. There was also a
companion action brought in Thompson v. University of Minnesota
at Duluth,107 in which a similar result was reached in denying the
defendant-university’s motion to dismiss in this action seeking a
women’s varsity ice hockey team. Subsequently, the trial court
judge ruled that the plaintiffs in Grandson and Thompson did not

102

No. 95-CV-1371 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1997) (granting in part and denying in part the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
103
Id., slip op. at 33–34.
104
Id. at 34.
105
Harper v. Bd. of Regents, Ill. State Univ., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123 (C.D. Ill. 1999),
aff’d sub nom. Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents of Ill. State Univ., 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir.
1999). See also infra text accompanying notes 151–152.
106
No. 97-CV-265 (D. Minn. March 16, 1998), aff’d, 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002).
107
No. 97-CV-1072 (D. Minn. March 16, 1998), aff’d sub nom. Grandson v. Univ. of
Minn., 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002).
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have standing to sue.108 The plaintiffs in both these cases filed
appeals, which were consolidated.109
Finally, on November 20, 2001, the Eighth Circuit reviewed
the three main issues advanced in the two cases. First, it ruled that
the plaintiffs’ request for the university to provide a women’s
varsity hockey team was properly deemed moot, since the
university now offered the team.110 Second, the plaintiffs sought to
amend their Title IX lawsuit as a class action alleging unequal
treatment of female student-athletes; the appellate court upheld as
appropriate the district court’s decision dismissing claims based on
failure to timely serve requests for class certification.111 Third, one
plaintiff sought to amend the complaint to request damages for
failure of the university to award her a soccer scholarship. The
appellate court again affirmed the lower court’s denial of a request
to amend damages was proper where there “was no allegation of
prior notice of their complaints to appropriate [University of
Minnesota at Duluth (UMD)] officials, no allegation of deliberate
indifference by such officials, and no allegation they had afforded
UMD a reasonable opportunity to rectify the alleged violations.”112
In 1998, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,
the Supreme Court issued its stern standard to be applied in Title
IX cases involving sexual harassment claims made by a student
against an educational institution for actions of a teacher:
“[D]amages may not be recovered in those circumstances unless an
108

See id.; Grandson, No. 97-CV-265. The appellants’ briefs indicated that the
university announced the creation of a women’s varsity hockey team and athletic
scholarships for the women’s soccer team only after the female students had filed their
lawsuits. Appellants’ Reply Brief & Supplemental Addendum, at 3–4, Grandson, 272
F.3d at 568 (No. 99-1817) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief]. The plaintiffs’ motion to
amend the complaint had been denied. In light of the Gebser requirements, Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998), the students argued that actual notice
of the Title IX discrimination came from students, women’s groups and the university’s
own employees. Appellants’ Brief at 10. The students, who sought creation of a
women’s varsity ice hockey team, stated, “Failure to address complaints of gender
discrimination under Title IX until after a lawsuit has been filed is the very epitome of
deliberate indifference.” Id. at 13.
109
Grandson, 272 F.3d at 568.
110
Id. at 574.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 575.
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official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to
institute corrective measures on the district’s behalf has actual
notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s
misconduct.”113 The Eighth Circuit applied the Gebser standard
arising from a Title IX sexual harassment lawsuit to a Title IX
athletics equal opportunity lawsuit: “When an individual plaintiff
such as Grandson claims money damages from a specific Title IX
violation, such as failing to award her a soccer scholarship, Gebser
requires prior notice to a university official with authority to
address the complaint and a response demonstrating indifference to
the alleged violation.”114 This appellate court specifically rejected
any of the following actions as satisfying the notice requirement:
the prior filing of an administrative complaint with the OCR;115 the
student’s complaint to the director of UMD’s Office of Equal
Opportunity,116 as this was after she had quit the women’s varsity
soccer team; and UMD’s allegedly “[c]onsistently unequal
expenditures for its men’s and women’s athletic teams[, which was
not] sufficient evidence of the deliberate indifference required by
Gebser.”117 The plaintiffs in Grandson unsuccessfully sought final
appellate review by the Supreme Court.118
Despite many cases seeking certiorari, the Supreme Court has
never reviewed a Title IX lawsuit challenging a transgression of
113

Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
Grandson, 272 F.3d at 576. See also Mercer v. Duke Univ., 181 F. Supp. 2d 525,
539–40 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (finding that female student-athlete had properly placed the
university on notice).
115
Id. at 575.
116
See id. at 576.
117
Id. Remarkably, female college students had been successful in all Title IX lawsuits
initiated within the past thirty years except for this recent Eighth Circuit decision.
Grandson appears to be the first post-Gebser decision to apply the standard articulated by
the Supreme Court in a Title IX sexual harassment case where neither the statute nor
implementing regulations mentioned sexual harassment, as opposed to traditional sex
discrimination, as it involves separate athletic programs voluntarily provided by
educational institutions. It remains to be seen whether requiring female students in nonsexual harassment cases to meet a standard imposed in Title IX sexual harassment cases
is the proper analysis. Imposing the strict Gebser standard to equal opportunity matters
will certainly prove a barrier to students seeking gender equity in athletic programs some
thirty years after the statute’s passage and where many schools have yet to achieve true
equity for their female students despite the lengthy passage of time.
118
122 S. Ct. 1910 (2002).
114
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equal opportunity in separate athletic programs provided to male
and female student-athletes.119 During 1999, critics asserted that
Title IX (and by implication the effective accommodation test)
constituted a quota system, but the Honorable Norma Cantu,
Assistant Secretary of the OCR, emphatically argued that Title IX
was not a quota system.120
A number of cases were settled involving female collegiate
students. During November 1998, female students in Seigler v.
Presbyterian College,121 alleged unequal athletic opportunities and
unequal distribution of athletic scholarships at the South Carolina
college, where female students comprised 50% of the
undergraduate population, but reflected a mere 22% as studentathletes, and received only 18% of athletic scholarships. The
parties settled the lawsuit during 1999. The settlement is notable
because it required the college to hire a women’s softball coach
with a salary within $3,500 of that paid to the men’s baseball
coach, and because it required that the college not cut funding or
facilities for the baseball team in order to implement equity for the
softball team.122

119

See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1186 (1997); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill.
1993), aff’d, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995).
120
Norman V. Cantu, Letter to the Sports Editor, College Athletics’ Title IX Law Is Not
a Quota System, USA TODAY, July 22, 1999, at 14A (“[Title IX] is not a quota system. .
. . Nothing in Title IX requires the cutting of men’s sports, and schools have viable
alternatives for providing equal opportunity in athletics.”). See also Andrew Zimbalist,
Backlash Against Title IX: An End Run Around Female Athletes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Mar. 3, 2000, at B9 (“It is duplicitous for colleges and universities to accept the fruits of
amateurism for men’s sports and then invoke business principles when it comes to
financing women’s sports.”).
121
No. 98-CV-3475 (D.S.C. filed Nov. 27, 1998).
122
Settlement and Release Agreement, paras. 1, 18, Seigler v. Presbyterian Coll., No.
98-CV-3475 (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 1999). Moreover, the college must provide over a period
of years, at least as many scholarships in aggregate as the baseball team offers. Id. para.
13. The settlement details a number of factors concerning the facilities provided to the
softball team, including the construction of permanent, stationary dugouts to
accommodate seating for the entire softball team to be in place by January 1, 2000 (an
extremely brief time-frame). Id. para. 3. It also requires the college not discriminate in
the scheduling of any summer softball camps provided on-campus. Id. para. 2.
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During April 1997, the New York district court approved the
settlement establishing a women’s varsity ice hockey team in
Bryant v. Colgate University.123 During 1997, the parties settled
the lawsuit in Carver v. St. Leo’s College,124 which was brought on
behalf of individual female varsity softball players seeking
retention of their sport.
b) Interscholastic Athletics
During Title IX’s history, there has been little legal addressing
“equal opportunity” involving interscholastic athletics.125 In
Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass’n, the Sixth Circuit
found that there was no evidence of discriminatory animus to
support a Title IX claim that the failure of the school districts to
provide fast-pitch softball for female high school students was
discriminatory based on gender.126 The Sixth Circuit, in this 2-1
decision, stated that to establish intentional discrimination the
proponents must demonstrate evidence of discriminatory animus
versus notice or deliberate indifference, which was used in prior
Supreme Court sexual harassment decisions. The Sixth Circuit
concluded, “Because of Plaintiffs’ fundamental failure to establish
a violation of Title IX, let alone an intentional violation, we need
not adopt any test at this time.”127 The dissent strongly opposed
this position stating, “I believe that, short of a defendant actually

123

No. 93-CV-1029, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21518 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1997) (outlining
the proposed settlement). The following year, the court grappled with the issue of
attorneys’ fees. Bryant v. Colgate Univ., 996 F. Supp. 170 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). See also
Heckman, supra note 10, at 869.
124
No. 96-CV-383 (M.D. Fla. settled May 22, 1997).
125
But see Fritson v. Minden Pub. Sch., No. 95-CV-3129 (D. Neb. 1995); Liberty v.
Holdrege Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 44, No. 95-CV-3127 (D. Neb. 1995); Praster v. N. Platte
Sch. Dist., No. 95-CV-3128 (D. Neb. 1995); Thomsen v. Fremont Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
No. 95-CV-3124 (D. Neb. 1995). These four lawsuits were simultaneously filed on April
5, 1995, alleging unequal opportunities and benefits for female student-athletes, including
the non-offering of interscholastic softball teams for the females. During 1996, the four
cases settled with the establishment of girls’ softball teams at the respective school
districts.
126
206 F.3d 685, 696 (6th Cir. 2000).
127
Id. at 692.
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defying a court injunction, the ‘animus’ standard will almost never
be met in a Title IX athletic-equity case.”128 The dissent found:
[P]urported “unintentional” violations of Title IX are
pervasive in our educational institutions even a quartercentury after the statute’s enactment. While much has
changed for female athletes since the passage of Title IX,
much remains the same . . . Because the “animus” standard
ensures that Title IX defendants will be virtually
impervious to a money judgment, they have little incentive
to rectify any inequities in their athletic programs until
judicially directed.129
On October 2, 1996, less than eight months after the institution
of a lawsuit, the parties in Randolph v. Owasso Independent School
District130 agreed to a consent decree addressing the interscholastic
sports program. On March 8, 1996, female student-athletes filed a
complaint in Bull v. Tulsa Public Schools131 alleging inequitable
conditions fostered on them. Female high school student-athletes,
who alleged sex discrimination against the Michigan High School
Athletic Association, were questioning whether the defendantassociation was a recipient of federal funds in Communities for
Equity v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n.132 In Alston v.
Virginia High School League,133 female students prevailed in their
128

Id. at 701 (Jones, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
130
No. 96-CV-0105 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 15, 1996).
131
No. 96-CV-0180 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 8, 1996).
132
26 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (W.D. Mich. 1998). The defendant, MHSAA moved for
summary judgment, arguing it is not subject to Title IX or a state actor for Constitutional
purposes. The Clinton Administration’s Department of Justice filed an amicus brief
against these positions. See also Cmtys. for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 80
F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (addressing a number of motions by the parties,
including whether a civil rights organization had standing to bring a Title IX lawsuit;
whether the MHSAA, a state athletic association, was a proper party defendant; and
whether certain named defendants, who were officials of the MHSAA could be sued in
their individual capacity).
133
176 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1997). The boys’ divisions (A, AA, and AAA) all played
in the same season, but not so for all the girls’ divisions. The girls’ volleyball, basketball,
and tennis teams played different seasons based on the school enrollment, while all boys’
teams were aligned regardless of the school size. Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, 184
F.R.D. 574, 576 (W.D. Va. 1997) (ruling a conflict of interest prevented the female
student-athletes from being certified as a class). Ultimately, on July 20, 2000, each of the
129
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lawsuit alleging that the state high school league violated Title IX
with the seasonal placement scheduling of certain interscholastic
sports for females, which differed from the boys’ teams.
The next series of cases involving high schools in Brevard
County, Florida, showcase the first Title IX decisions to examine
in detail other benefits and opportunities provided to male studentathletes, but not female student-athletes as directed by the equal
opportunity subsection.134 Three decisions were rendered in
Daniels v. School Board of Brevard County,135 where female
student-athletes contended discrimination due to alleged
inequitable benefits and conditions provided to the girls’ high
school softball team as compared to the boys’ baseball team
including: inequities concerning the electronic scoreboards, batting
cages, bleachers, signs, concession stand, press box, bathroom
facilities and field lighting. In the November 25, 1997, decision, a
Florida district court granted the female students a preliminary
injunction and ordered the school board to propose a plan to rectify
the alleged discrimination.136 The preliminary injunction did not
named female student-plaintiff were awarded $17,000 by a Virginia jury. Vicari, supra
note 18, at 15.
134
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)–(10) (2002). For an account of an interscholastic coach
who filed a Title IX administrative complaint seeking equitable benefits for female
student-athletes, see Johnette Howard, Contested Terrain, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 17,
2001 at C12–16. The girls’ field hockey coach for over thirty-one years—and only
female physical education teacher at the Centereach High School on Long Island, New
York, for eighteen years—sought a team room for all female athletes similar to the 2,929square-foot-facility provided to the boys; the girls’ room measured 1,040 square feet. See
id.
135
985 F. Supp. 1458 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (granting athletes’ preliminary injunction and
ordering the school board to propose a remedial plan) [hereinafter Daniels I]. See also
Daniels v. School Bd. of Brevard County, Fla., 995 F. Supp. 1394 (M.D. Fla. 1997)
(rejecting the board’s plan and granting a permanent injunction against the school board)
[hereinafter Daniels II]; Landow v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 132 F. Supp. 2d 958
(M.D. Fla. 2000) (noting that Landow became the new named plaintiff in the same class
action).
136
Daniels I, 985 F. Supp. at 1462. The School Board’s plan centered predominantly on
withholding or eliminating items from the boys’ baseball team, rather than affording the
girls’ softball team certain items. See Daniels II, 995 F. Supp. at 1396. The court noted
that the “School Board proposes not to spend any funds to remedy the inequities
identified in the prior Order,” other than the installation of lights for the girls’ fields,
which had previously been approved. Id. at 1395. However, if the lights were not
installed, then the board proposed disallowing the lights for the boys’ field. Id.
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mandate the expenditure of an explicit amount of funds to rectify
the inequities in the provision of the girls’ softball team. In the
December 23, 1997 decision, the court found that the terms of the
preliminary injunction were proper.137
In Landow v. School Board of Brevard County,138 once again
the district court held that disparities between Brevard County’s
girls’ softball program and the boys’ baseball program violated
Title IX. The girls did not have an available scoreboard, lighted
field, a concession stand, or press box. The court noted that the
“softball teams are forced to ‘make do’ by playing on fields that
are built to the dimensions of a different sport: men’s slow-pitch
softball. This signals to the girls that they are not as important as
the boys.”139 An interesting aspect of the decision was the
pronouncement that “evidence concerning whether the girls’
softball teams have the same ability as the boys’ baseball teams to
raise funds through gate admission fees, concession stand
revenues, and sales of advertising signs, is immaterial.”140 The
court found that the absence of batting cages and a lighted field for
females violated the provisions of Title IX regarding equipment
and supplies and the scheduling of games and practice times.141
The court nevertheless found the “School Board is not obligated to
ensure absolute parity in coaching ability.”142

137

See id. at 1394 (M.D. Fla. 1997). The court identified that two class actions have
been commenced concerning the lack of softball fields by other schools. See id. at 1397.
138
132 F. Supp. 2d 958 (M.D. Fla. 2001). In this class action lawsuit, the court
analyzed Title IX on a county-wide basis versus a school-by-school basis. Id. at 962. The
decision also mentioned a Florida statute governing gender equity, FLA. STAT. ch.
228.2001(2)(a) (2002) (tracking the Title IX regulation governing “equal opportunity” in
athletics, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)–(10) (2002)).
139
Landow, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 964. Thus, “the girls do not actually practice and play
on true fast-pitch softball fields.” Id. at 960.
140
Id. at 962.
141
See id. at 964.
142
Id. See also Landow v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, No. 97-CV-1463, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7155, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2002) (approving the joint plan the parties
submitted dated March 5, 2001, with new softball fields to be constructed at the two high
schools).
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3. Male Student-Athletes
During the 1990s, Title IX was decried across the country for
being an anathema to retention of certain men’s collegiate teams.
Even Representative J. Dennis Hastert, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and a former wrestler, testified during
Congressional hearings on the matter.143 Nonetheless, antagonism
with Title IX is not a new phenomenon. Since the Tower
Amendment in 1974,144 individuals have sought to pierce Title IX
overall, or at least fillet the law when it comes to interfering with
men’s sports.145 This issue of Title IX’s applicability to men’s
sports, but especially men’s intercollegiate athletics, has raised the
most passion (and probably the most misinformation about what
Title IX entails). There has been minimal recent legal action
involving male student-athletes, who uniformly have sought to
forestall their teams from elimination.146 While certain men’s nonrevenue teams are sometimes slated for termination under the guise
of achieving Title IX compliance, as previously indicated, it would
be illuminative to ascertain the monies expended on the entire
men’s athletic department.147 Universities continue to base
elimination of men’s intercollegiate teams on Title IX.148
143

See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Postsecondary Educ., Training & Life-Long Learning, House Comm. on Econ. & Educ.
Opportunities, 104th Cong. 9–17 (1995) (testimony and prepared statement of Hon J.
Dennis Hastert).
144
See Amend. 1343 to S. 1539, 93d Cong., 120 CONG. REC. 15322 (1974) (proposing
to eliminate revenue-generating sports from Title IX calculation).
145
See Heckman, supra note 3, at 11–12.
146
See, e.g., Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (denying
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the elimination of the men’s
wrestling team); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993)
(finding no Title IX violation where members of the men’s swimming team sought relief
from having their team eliminated), aff’d, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994); Cooper v.
Peterson, 626 N.Y.S.2d 432 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (granting St. Lawrence University’s
motion to dismiss the action brought by members of the men’s wrestling team, which was
slated for elimination); Heckman, supra note 25, at 421 n.142.
147
See Heckman, supra note 67, at 997. The increasing escalation of costs spent on
men’s athletic programs continues to raise ire. The New York Times reported the
University of Oregon purportedly spent $250,000 on a “seven-story-high billboard near
Madison Square Garden to promote its quarterback for the Heisman Trophy.” Jodi
Wilgoren, Spiraling Sports Budgets Draw Fire from Faculties, N.Y. TIMES, July 29,
2001, at 12. Recently, CBS signed a $6.2 billion, eleven-year television contract to
telecast the NCAA men’s basketball tournament. See Janis Carr, Are You Ready for
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Men’s intercollegiate wrestling teams have been particularly
battered. Nonetheless, the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits found no Title IX violation in cases commenced by male
intercollegiate student-athletes. In Harper v. Board of Regents of
Illinois State University,149 members of the men’s soccer and
wrestling teams commenced a lawsuit in 1995 seeking retention of
their teams. The district court granted in part and denied in part
the defendant’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint,
including the sustaining of the Title IX cause of action, but only
against the university and the Board of Regents.150 On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the male athletes’ stance that Title IX was
violated, incorporating the prior Seventh Circuit decision in Kelley
v. Board of Regents of the University of Illinois,151 which dealt
with the elimination of the men’s swimming team, stating:
Some . . . Lacrosse?: Colleges—The National Collegiate Sports Network Plans to
Spotlight Non-Major Sports, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 31, 2002, at A1. The deal does
not call for CBS to televise any of the women’s tournament games, not even the final
championship game. The latest installment of the Knight Foundation’s Commission on
Intercollegiate Athletics decried the escalation of costs and advised that colleges should
put a stop to the increasing commercialization of intercollegiate athletics. The
commission’s report also commented on Title IX, recommending that universities ensure
compliance, stating, the “legitimate and long-overdue need to support women’s athletic
programs and comply with Title IX is not used as an excuse for soaring costs while
expenses in big time sports are unchecked.” Knight Commission on Intercollegiate
Athletics, A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports and Higher Education, 2001
REP. KNIGHT COMM’N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 27, http://www.knightfdn.org/
downloads/pdf/KCfinal_06-2001.pdf. See also Donna Lopiano, The Real Culprit in the
Cutting of Men’s Olympic Sports, Women’s Sports Foundation, at
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/opin/article.html?record=
776 (May 10, 2001) (Lopiano, former women’s athletic director at University of Texas,
and Executive Director of the Women’s Sports Foundation, enumerated specific
instances of spending of men’s teams. For example, “Following a football season in
which a football team won seven games, the head coach treated his entire staff and their
wives to a trip to the Bahamas.”).
148
See, e.g., Joe Schad, Providence 9 Tells Schools: Take That!, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May
24, 1999, at A38 (Providence College, a member of the Big East Conference, apparently
decided to drop the men’s baseball team due to Title IX. “Providence administrators . . .
said they had no choice but to drop the three men’s programs because the university’s
enrollment is 58 percent female but females make up only 48 percent of the school’s
athletes.”).
149
35 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents of
Ill. State Univ., 198 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
150
Id.
151
35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
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In short, the plaintiffs-appellants attempt to draw a
distinction between decisions in which sex is a
consideration (as in Kelley) and decisions in which sex
serves as the motivating factor (as in the present case).
We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs-appellants’
attempt to distinguish decisions to eliminate athletic
programs motivated by financial concerns from those based
on considerations of sex. That distinction ignores the fact
that a university’s decision as to which athletic programs to
offer necessarily entails budgetary considerations. For
universities, decisions about cutting or adding athletic
programs are based on a consideration of many factors
including: the total size of the athletic department, which is
governed by budgetary considerations, and the distribution
of programs among men and women, which is governed by
Title IX concerns. To say that one decision is financial,
while another is sex-based, assumes that these two aspects
can be neatly separated. They cannot. Absent financial
concerns, Illinois State University presumably would rather
have added women’s programs while keeping its men’s
programs intact. Similarly, in the absence of Title IX
concerns, the University of Illinois in Kelley would have
cut both its men’s and women’s swimming programs in
order to save money. Ultimately, both the decision of the
University in this case and the decision of the University of
Illinois at issue in Kelley were based on a combination of
financial and sex-based concerns that are not easily
distinguished.152
Application of the first prong of the three-part effective
accommodation test was at issue in the next case, also brought by
male wrestlers, where the district court had eschewed application
of the substantial proportionality comparison found in the first
prong. On December 15, 1999, the Ninth Circuit in Neal v. Board
of Trustees of the California State Universities,153 reversed the

152
153

Boulahanis, 198 F.3d at 637.
198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2000).
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California district court’s refusal to provide the first prong with
“safe harbor” status.154
Male wrestlers were not successful in maintaining their team in
Chalenor v. University of North Dakota,155 despite the fact that
there were sufficient funds. Male students were overwhelmingly
represented as student-athletes at this state university, and thus met
the first prong of the effective accommodation test.
In Miami University Wrestling Club v. Miami University,156
male wrestlers at this university located in Ohio were unsuccessful
in pursuing a complaint alleging violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Title IX to retain their
team. On March 24, 2000, the Ohio district court dismissed the
Title IX action against both the university and individually-named
defendants and also dismissed the equal protection claim against
the university. On January 24, 2001, the court dismissed the equal
protection claims asserted against the individually-named
defendants and denied the wrestlers’ motion for reconsideration of
the court’s rejection of their Title IX claim against the university.
154

Id. at 768.
142 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D.N.D. 2000), aff’d, 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002). The
Eighth Circuit was the first circuit court to address the January 16, 1996 letter of
Assistant Secretary Cantu indicating that “an institution can choose which part of the test
it plans to meet.” Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1045. The court further stated that “a public
university cannot avoid its legal obligations by substituting funds from private sources for
funds from tax revenues. Once a university receives a monetary donation the fund
becomes public money, subject to Title IX’s legal obligations in their disbursement.” Id.
at 1048. The Eighth Circuit has yet to rule on application of the three-prong effective
accommodation test. In this decision, while the appellate court indicated that the 1979
policy interpretation should be accorded a “controlling deference,” id. at 1047, it
nonetheless withheld its judicial imprimatur stating, “The validity of the interpretation
was not put in question before the District Court, so the Court relied, as it was supposed
to, on that interpretation. As we are not presented with that issue here, consideration of it
will have to await another day.” Id. The Eighth Circuit also did not reach application of
the policy interpretation in Grandson v. University of Minnesota, 272 F.3d 568 (8th Cir.
2001), due to the court’s determination that the plaintiff failed to satisfy a notice
requirement.
156
195 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ohio 2001), aff’d, 802 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 2002). The
men’s wrestling, tennis, and soccer teams were slated for elimination. The university
indicated that elimination of the three men’s teams was being done to comply with Title
IX. During 1999, the school agreed to provide the male wrestlers with athletic
scholarships during the tenure. The Center for Individual Rights represented the
plaintiffs. Id.
155
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In addressing classifications based on gender pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court noted:
The objective explicitly underlying both Title IX and the
challenged actions of the individual Defendants herein is
the elimination of the effects of past discrimination against
women in publicly funded athletic programs, particularly
those administered by public educational institutions. That
objective is borne out in the legislative history of Title IX
and in the unequivocal evidence of record in this matter.157
On the motion for reconsideration as to the Title IX claim, the
court stated:
The [Sixth Circuit] Court of Appeals noted in its Horner II
decision that Title IX does not require strict gender parity
but rather the equal accommodation of interest by male and
female
students
in
athletic
participation
and
opportunities . . . [T]o state a claim under Title IX, . . . a
plaintiff must allege that an institution receiving public
funding has failed to provide equal athletic opportunities by
gender . . . Plaintiffs make no such allegation.158
Thus, the court found that even if it had relied to some extent on
the policy interpretation to support its earlier determination, the
failure by the plaintiffs to properly advance a prima facie Title IX
claim rendered the claim ultimately defective.159 The court
emphasized, “Equal accommodation of the athletic abilities and
interests of the sexes ought to be the ultimate objective of any
program or policy related to athletic opportunities at publicly
funded institutions.”160 The court also found that, “Calculations of
relative interest in athletic participation will often be skewed by
imbalances in the number of students recruited to the institution
specifically for their athletic ability and interest.”161
157

Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1018.
159
See id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 1019. The court continued, the “most obvious method of accounting for the
skewing effect of an imbalance caused by disparities in opportunities currently available
is to provide equal opportunities on the basis of numerical proportionality and then to
158
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During January of 2002, in National Wrestling Coaches Ass’n
v. Department of Education,162 members of various collegiate
wrestling associations commenced a lawsuit against the
Department of Education challenging that the Title IX regulations,
specifically the two governing athletics, and the 1979 Policy
Interpretation, which yields the “effective accommodation test”
were not properly approved by the President in violation of section
902 of the statute.163
C. Athletic Scholarships
Another section of the Title IX Regulations instructs on the
provision of athletic scholarships. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c), states:
(1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic
scholarships or grants-in-aid, it must provide
reasonable opportunities for such awards for
members of each sex in proportion to the number of
students of each sex participating in interscholastic
or intercollegiate athletics.
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for
members of each sex may be provided as part of
separate athletic teams for members of each sex to
the extent consistent with this paragraph and §
106.41.164

consider lingering interest among non-participating students when making future
decisions regarding the provision of athletic opportunities.” Id.
162
No. 02-CV-00072 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 16, 2002). The Department of Education
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, which was scheduled for submission during June
2002.
163
See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2000):
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any educational program or activity . . . is authorized and
directed to effectuate the provisions of section 901 with respect to such
program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
application which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the
statute . . . . No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless
and until approved by the President.
Id.
164
34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (2002).
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During Title IX’s first twenty-five years, there has been only
one judicial decision concerning the application of this regulation
with the distribution of athletic scholarships by educational
institutions.165 Male wrestlers unsuccessfully sought judicial
intervention to prohibit the reduction of certain scholarships for
their sport in Neal v. Board of Trustees of the California State
Universities.166 While not dealing with the required distribution of
athletic scholarships, in Beasley v. Alabama State University,167 a
female volleyball player alleged Title IX discrimination for being
mistreated for an injury which resulted in the revocation of her
athletic scholarship. Significantly, during 1998, the OCR informed
its constituency that a one percent differential between the
percentage of athletes of one sex and the percentage of athletic
scholarships—or one scholarship differential—will be tolerated.168
One counsel commented, “The failure of the NCAA and OCR to
cooperate in developing a realistic mechanism for accommodating
institutional efforts in achieving gender-equity in scholarships is
puzzling and disturbing.”169

165

See Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (granting the
university’s motion for summary judgment); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989
(S.D. Iowa 1994) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction which sought
the prevention of the university’s intention to eliminate the men’s wrestling team).
166
198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Brian A. Snow, Broadening the Demand for
Gender-Equity in Athletics: Financial Aid and Coaches’ Compensation, 130 EDUC. L.
REP. 965, 967 n.9 (1999) (The court issued a temporary restraining order—which was
vacated on appeal—on the wrestlers’ behalf that would prevent the university from
trimming the number of athletic scholarships for this male team. Mr. Snow was counsel
to Colorado State University in Roberts v. Colorado State University, 998 F.2d 824 (10th
Cir. 1993).).
167
966 F. Supp. 1117 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (concerning application of the statute of
limitations). The court reported Beasley’s claims that she was a recruited to play
volleyball at the state university with a promise of an athletic scholarship, which did not
materialize during her freshman year due to a lack of allocated funds for this team, and,
secondarily, while playing volleyball she suffered a foot injury, which she alleged that
the school declined to provide financial coverage for until a few years later. See id. at
1121; Beasley v. Ala. State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (providing an
additional exposition on the issue of application of the statute of limitations).
168
The 1999–00 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT, supra note 49, tbl. 7, at 20, found
male student-athletes received 57% ($1,411,400) of athletic scholarships, compared to
43% ($1,055,500) awarded to female student-athletes, at Division I programs overall.
169
See Snow, supra note 166, at 977.
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EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETIC EMPLOYMENT

When sex discrimination occurs in the employment context,
the question arises: Under what federal statutes can the relief be
sought? Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter
“Title VII”)170 prohibits sex discrimination in the terms and
conditions of employment, and is applicable to most public and
private employers, including educational employers. The critical
language of Title VII directs:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . sex . . . .171
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (hereinafter “Equal Pay Act”),172
which also covers educational employees, governs the issue of
compensation. The statute imposes equal pay “for equal work on
jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions . . . .”173 Whether educational employees may also
pursue a claim of sex discrimination via Title IX is an issue which
came to the forefront in the 1990s, and presently remains
unresolved.
A. Educational Employment Generally
The pivotal question is whether any educational employee may
assert a Title IX cause of action or whether they must pursue an
170

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). See also Diane Heckman, Lowrey v. Texas A&M
University System: Title IX Vis-à-Vis Title VII Sex Discrimination in Educational
Institutions, 124 EDUC. L. REP. 753 (1998); Heckman, supra note 34, at 592–614.
171
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). See also, e.g., Fuhr v. Sch. Dist. of the City of Hazel
Park, 131 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (concluding an issue of fact existed in this
Title VII action as to whether the failure to promote the current girls’ basketball coach, a
female, as the boys’ basketball coach was based on sex discrimination). See generally
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (deciding when punitive damages may
be awarded in a Title VII action as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
172
29 U.S.C. § 206(d), (d)(1) (2000).
173
Id.

5 - HECKMAN FORMAT

590

4/15/03 9:51 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 551

action under either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII. When
allegations of sex discrimination by educational employees are
raised, conflicting judicial decisions have yielded the following
array of options: (a) there is no Title IX cause of action for sex
discrimination; (b) there is a Title IX cause of action; (c) there is
only a Title IX cause of action for employment claims of
retaliation; (d) there is no Title IX cause of action for employment
claims of retaliation; (e) Title VII standards will be applied when a
Title IX cause of action is alleged; (f) Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (hereinafter “Title VI”)174 standards will be applied; or
(g) Title IX standards will be applied. An anomalous situation has
arisen where educational employees assert Title IX sex
discrimination, depending on whether the individual is a regular
employee or an athletic employee. Courts have been more willing
to find a Title IX cause of action brought by athletic department
employees than in cases brought by non-athletic employees.
Between 1995 and 1996, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits all ruled on this issue involving non-athletic department
employees, in, respectively: Lakoski v. James,175 Ivan v. Kent State
174

42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6(a) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race in certain
public places, such as educational institutions).
175
66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit rejected claim by the female medical
professor, who was denied tenure, that Title IX provided a private cause of action for sex
discrimination. The Fifth Circuit stated:
We are not persuaded that Congress intended that Title IX offer a bypass of the
remedial process of Title VII. We hold that Title VII provides the exclusive
remedy for individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex
in federally funded educational institutions. We limit our holding to
individuals seeking money damages under Title IX directly or derivatively
through Section 1983 for employment practices for which Title VII provides a
remedy, expressing no opinion whether Title VII excludes suits seeking only
declaratory or injunctive relief.
Id. at 753. It amplified that:
Given the availability of a private remedy under Title VII for aggrieved
employees, we are unwilling to follow Dr. Lakoski’s beguilingly simple
syllogism that Cannon, Bell, and Franklin all add up to an implied private right
of action for damages under employment discrimination. Doing so would
disrupt a carefully balanced remedial scheme for redressing employment
discrimination by employers such as the University of Texas Medical Branch.
Id. at 754. The appellate court cited the Department of Justice regulations for
investigation of Title IX employment discrimination, 28 C.F.R. § 42.604 (1994), and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] regulations, which adopt an
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University,176 Waid v. Merrill Area Public Schools,177 and Brine v.
University of Iowa.178 Recent decisions have yielded mixed
results. In 1997, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Holt v.
Lewis179 and Brine v. University of Iowa.180
Sandra Musso alleged that the defendant-university demoted
her and then refused to renew her contract as Director of Sports
Facilities because of her sex in Musso v. University of
Minnesota.181 In 1980, the university entered into a consent decree
that governed sex discrimination claims brought by female
academic employees.182 The district court found the university’s
actions were not the result of sex-based discrimination.183 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed that result, but reversed the district court’s
determination as to a retaliation claim, remanding this issue back
to the district court with instructions to dismiss that claim.184
The Sixth Circuit relied on Title VII to determine the unequal
pay claim advanced via Title IX in Buntin v. Breathitt County
Board of Education.185 In this case, the female former Director of
Pupil Personnel alleged she was paid less than her male
predecessor in violation of Title IX. The court reversed a previous
grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the employer since

identical view of Title IX’s scope, 29 C.F.R. § 1691.4 (1994). Id. at 757. See also
Heckman, supra note 170, at 755–58.
176
No. 94-4090, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 22269 (6th Cir. filed July 26, 1996) (affirming
a grant of summary judgment for a university advisor and supervisor against a student’s
gender discrimination claim of Title VII and Title IX violations based on her pregnancy
and later childbirth).
177
91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a teacher who previously prevailed on a
state employment discrimination claim was not precluded from seeking additional
remedies against appellee school system under Title IX).
178
90 F.3d 271 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing the lower court’s judgment for plaintiff
faculty members based on a failure to prove a causal connection between their allegations
of sex discrimination and defendant university’s closing of its dental hygiene program).
179
522 U.S. 817 (1997).
180
519 U.S. 1149 (1997).
181
105 F.3d 409 (8th Cir. 1997).
182
Id. at 440.
183
Id. at 441.
184
Id.
185
134 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1998).
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the plaintiff employee had met her prima facie burden of
demonstrating employment discrimination.186
In Carter v. Cornell University,187 a black female employed as
a senior administrative secretary at Cornell University Medical
Center alleged sex discrimination and racial discrimination due to
poor evaluations she received. On September 4, 1997, the New
York district court ruled that it would apply Title VII standards to
her Title IX claim. “However, because plaintiff has raised Title IX
claims dealing with sex discrimination and because Title IX adopts
Title VII substantive standards . . . the court deals with both gender
and race discrimination under Title VII.”188 The court also noted
that “the Second Circuit has held that Title VII standards are to be
applied in interpreting Title IX . . . .”189 Thus, the district court did
“[n]ot reach the question of whether Title IX extends to employees
involved in federally funded educational programs.”190 The
following year, the same New York district court ruled, in Burrell
v. City University of New York,191 that Title IX did not provide a
university employee with a private right of action for sex
186

Id. at 799.
976 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, No. 97-CV-9180, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
18807 (2d Cir. July 9, 1998).
188
Id. at 229 n.2.
189
Id. at 232, citing Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 630 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997), and Murray
v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 248 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Weinstock v.
Columbia Univ., No. 95-CV-569, 1999 WL 549006 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1999), aff’d, 224
F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000).
190
Id. at 232. Compare Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754 (5th Cir. 1995) (refusing to
find a Title IX cause of action given the availability of Title VII for aggrieved
employees), with Henschke v. New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, 821 F. Supp.
166, 171–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a private right of action exists under Title IX
for employees of federally funded educational programs).
191
995 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Weinstock, 1999 WL 549006, at *1.
The district court granted the university’s motion for summary judgment as to Title VII
and Title IX causes of action by a female Ph.D. assistant professor in the chemistry
department at Barnard College, a part of Columbia University. She had alleged that she
was denied tenure due to sex discrimination. As to the Title IX claim, herein the court
would apply the same standards as with the three-prong burden-shifting analysis used
with Title VII cases. Id. at *7. See Gillen v. Borough of Manhattan Cmty. Coll., 1999 WL
221105 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1999), in a case brought by a female adjunct lecturer, who
alleged Title IX sexual harassment, the same district court in this earlier opinion, stated,
“[t]he provisions of Title IX have been construed to prohibit gender discrimination
against students and employees in educational institutions that receive federal funding.”
Id. at *2.
187
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discrimination. The Burrell court held that “the remedies of Title
IX are limited to student plaintiffs, and Title VII is meant to offer
the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination based on
sex.”192
In Cooper v. Gustavus Adolphus College,193 a Minnesota
district court found, “There is no private cause of action for
damages available to a college employee under Title IX for sex
discrimination.”194
B. Hiring
There continues be a scarcity of cases contesting hiring
opportunities for female coaches or athletic positions in education,
despite the paucity of women coaching men’s teams or being hired
as athletic directors. During Spring 2002, former professors R.
Vivian Acosta and Linda Jean Carpenter issued an installment of
their comprehensive study of women in intercollegiate sport
involved with the NCAA.195 The study illustrated an overall
downward trend for women in athletic employment positions. It
found the following: first, it showed that overall only 17.9% of
head athletic directors of women’s programs are women.196
Women hold the top athletic director positions of women’s
programs at 8.4% of Division I, 16.1% of Division II, and 27.6%
192

Burrell, 995 F. Supp. at 408.
957 F. Supp. 191 (D. Minn. 1997).
194
Id. at 193. See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 760 n.48.
195
See R. VIVIAN ACOSTA & LINDA JEAN CARPENTER, WOMEN IN INTERCOLLEGIATE
SPORT: LONGITUDINAL STUDY—TWENTY-FIVE YEAR UPDATE: 1977–2002, at 2 (2002),
available at http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/binary-data/WSF_ARTICLE/
pdf_file/906.pdf. The actual number of women being head coaches of men’s teams at
Division I schools is abominable some thirty years after Title IX’s passage. The few
women indicated as head coaches were in the sports of golf (one full-time) and track and
field/cross country (five full-time). See 1999–00 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT, Supra
note 49, tbl. 2A, at 13. The few women indicated as assistant coaches were in the sports
of soccer (one full-time), swimming/diving (one full-time), track and field/cross country
(six full-time) and other sports (one full-time). See id., tbl. 2B, at 14. This study does not
provide the percentage statistics for the NCAA overall or a breakdown of the percentages
for the respective divisions. See id.; infra note 204 (concerning the salaries accorded the
coaches of the men’s versus women’s teams).
196
ACOSTA & CARPENTER, supra note 195, at 16. This represents a decrease from
17.8% in 2000. Id. In 1998, 19.4% of women’s programs were directed by females, an
increase from 18.5% in 1996. Id.
193
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of Division III schools.197 In 1998, only thirty women were the
head athletic directors of Division I women’s athletic programs.198
The study also found that only 44% of coaches of women’s
teams of NCAA programs overall are females, down from 47.7%
in 1996.199 This represents the lowest percentage compiled for that
statistic. The 2002 figures disclosed that women comprise head
coaches as follows: 45.1% at the Division I level, 38.9% at
Division II, and 45.6% at Division III.200 Conversely, the
“percentage of females among the coaching ranks of men’s
athletics remains under 2% as it has been for at least the last three
decades,”201 while 55.5% of all assistant coaching positions of
women’s teams are female.202 Further, only 12.3% have women
serving as the full-time sports information directors and 27.8% of
head athletic trainers are women.203
C. Equal Pay
During 1998, a Chronicle of Higher Education survey found,
“At the median institution for men’s [NCAA intercollegiate] head
coaches, their average salary was $54,800. At the median
institution for women’s head coaches, their average salary was
$39,400. However, men’s coaches made 43% more than women’s
coaches at the median institution.”204
The 2001 Knight

197

Id.
Id. at 17.
199
Id. at 10.
200
Id. at 9. The overall figure shows a decline from women comprising 48.3% in 1992,
52.4% in 1982 and more than 90% in 1972 (when it was customary to have the same-sex
coach for the sports teams). Id. at 10.
201
Id. at 2.
202
Id. at 14. This demonstrates another decrease from 2000 figures: 59.8% of all
assistant coaching positions of women’s teams are female; with 62% at Division I, 54.5%
at Division II, and 59.3% at Division III. Id.
203
Id. at 18.
204
Jim Naughton, Salaries of Head Coaches Are Rising, Survey Shows: Men and
Women are Both Gaining, but a Gender Gap Persists, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 1,
1998, at A55. Coaches of women’s teams are still lagging behind in salaries. At
Division I, the average institutional expense for salaries for coaches of men’s teams was
$484,900 (59%), while the average institutional expense for salaries for coaches of
women’s teams was $330,500 (41%). 1999–00 NCAA GENDER-EQUITY REPORT, supra
note 49, tbl. 7, at 20. For assistant coaches, the average institutional expense for salaries
198
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Commission Report cautioned against the escalation in athletics
costs and stated, “A glaring symptom of the arms race run amok is
the salaries of the so-called ‘star’ coaches. At last count, some 30
[men’s] college football and men’s basketball coaches are paid a
million dollars or more a year. A few are nearing twice that, or are
already there.”205 Coaches of female teams are uniformly absent
from that extremely well-paid pantheon. The issue of equal pay
will be more roundly discussed in the cases involving termination
of athletic positions. There was no case law during this period
involving female athletic employees who, while employed, alleged
Title IX violations on the issue of unequal pay compared to male
athletic employees.
D. Termination
One of the most contested issues in Title IX jurisprudence
today is whether female coaches, female athletic employees or
coaches of female teams have been discriminated against when
they are terminated or not promoted.206 These cases routinely
include allegations of retaliation.207

for coaches of men’s teams was $580,100 (72%), while the average institutional expense
for salaries for assistant coaches of women’s teams was $231,000 (28%). Id. tbl. 7, at 20.
At Division I overall, the highest paid head coaches are the football coaches with an
average salary of $177,200. The average salary for coaches of men’s basketball teams
compared to coaches of women’s basketball teams is $149,700 to $91,300. Coaches of
men’s baseball teams receive an average salary of $55,400 compared to coaches of
women’s softball teams with an average salary of $38,900. There is a startling
discrepancy in salary for the sport of ice hockey, where coaches of the men’s teams
average $94,000 compared to only $43,600 for coaches of women’s teams. There is
almost parity in soccer, where the coaches of the men’s team average $42,500 compared
to $40,300 for the coaches of the women’s teams. Id. tbl. 5A, at 17.
The figures become more glaring when examining the high-profile Division I-A
universities and colleges, where the average compensation for football coaches is
$267,000. The next highest-paid coaches are the coaches of the men’s basketball teams
with average salaries of $216,400, compared to only $130,600 for coaches of women’s
teams. The average institutional salary for coaches of the baseball teams is $77,500
compared to $53,500 for softball teams. Parity is represented in soccer with $49,200 for
the men’s teams compared to $49,900 for the women’s teams. Id. tbl. 5A, at 29.
205
Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, supra note 147, at 18.
206
See Heckman, supra note 25, at 421–22 n.143 (listing the numerous lawsuits
commenced).
207
See infra Part III.E.
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1. Lowrey v. Texas A&M University System
In Lowrey v. Texas A&M University System,208 a female
athletic employee alleged retaliation and sex discrimination under
Title IX and state laws because she was not named athletic director
and was demoted from the women’s athletic coordinator position
at Tarleton University, which is part of the Texas A&M University
System.209 The district court dismissed the complaint in its
entirety.210 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court found that there was
no Title IX private discrimination cause of action for a female
coach at a post-secondary institution211 but allowed the claim for
retaliation.212
On remand, the district court denied in part and granted in part
defendants’ amended motion for summary judgment.213 First, the
court denied the defendants’ motion as to the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII claims of discrimination in pay.214 The court stressed that
discriminatory intent is not required for a prima facie case under
the Equal Pay Act, unlike for Title VII.215 Secondly, the court held
that although Lowrey could compare her salary to that of the male
men’s athletics coordinator she could not compare her pay to the
female women’s athletic coordinator. “The Equal Pay Act only
prohibits pay differences between members of the opposite sex,”216
the court instructed. However, the court denied summary
judgment since an issue of fact existed as to whether the plaintiff
received adequate, equal pay for her work as the Athletics
Coordinator.217 The court found:
The evidence . . . shows that Johnson [(the men’s athletics
coordinator)], who held a quasi-administrative position,
received $9,062 from the Athletics Administration Budget,
208

117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 244.
210
Id. at 245.
211
Id. at 251.
212
Id. at 252. See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 760–62 (analyzing the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling).
213
Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 11 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
214
Id. at 909.
215
Id. at 906.
216
Id. at 907.
217
See id. at 908.
209
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while Lowrey, who held a similar quasi-administrative
position, received nothing from the Athletics
Administration Budget.
Moreover, Johnson’s overall
salary increased by $5,430 after he assumed the positions
of Men’s Athletics Coordinator and NCAA Compliance
Coordinator while Lowrey’s salary did not rise at all when
she assumed the official position of Women’s Athletics
Coordinator.218
The court added, “None of Lowrey’s salary came out of the
Athletics Administration Budget; it all came out of the women’s
basketball and physical education budgets.”219
Next, the court analyzed the plaintiff’s Title VII and Title IX
claims separately. Under Title VII, the retaliatory action must
affect the ultimate employment decision concerning five actions:
hiring, granting leave, discharge, promotion, or compensation.220
“Demotion is the opposite of promotion [thus] . . . Lowrey’s
removal from the position [as Women’s Athletics Coordinator]
was an adverse employment action.”221 The court, therefore,
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII claim.
Concerning Title IX, the court stated, “While the Lowrey I court
held that Title IX implies a retaliation claim, the court did not
address what substantive legal standards apply to such a claim.”222
The court found that the Title IX retaliation claim “is best analyzed
under the standard Burdine-McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
scheme for employment discrimination claims.”223 Thus, the court
would apply a modified Title VII approach to the Title IX
retaliation claim.224 In critical language, the court stated, “Because
a Title IX retaliation claim only covers conduct protected by Title
IX, a plaintiff may only recover under Title IX when the defendant
retaliated against her ‘solely as a consequence of complaints
218

Id.
Id. at 909.
220
See id. at 910.
221
Id. at 907.
222
Id. at 911.
223
Id. But see 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2002) (“[T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
hereby adopted and incorporated herein by reference.”).
224
See Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 911; Naughton, supra note 204.
219
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alleging noncompliance with the substantive provisions of Title
IX.’”225 Moreover, “[r]etaliation claims brought under Title IX
protect against a broad array of retaliatory conduct unrelated to
employment.”226 Thus, the court set out the elements for
establishing such a prima facie claim of retaliation under Title IX:
(1) the plaintiff engaged in activities protected by Title IX; (2) the
university-employer took adverse action against the plaintiff; and
(3) a causal connection exists between the plaintiff’s protected
activities and the university-employer’s adverse action.227
Addressing the second element of its test, the district court
ruled that such adverse actions are not limited to “ultimate
employment decisions,”228 (referenced with Title VII claims)
rather the law “protects against a broader range of retaliatory
conduct.”229 Addressing the third element, the court found that the
plaintiff failed to establish a “causal connection between her
protected Title IX conduct and Tarleton’s failure to promote her to
Athletics Director.”230 However, the plaintiff did establish a prima
facie case as to her demotion.231 Thus, the court granted the
defendant summary judgment as to the Title IX retaliation claim
which dealt with the lack of a promotion, but denied summary
judgment on the Title IX retaliation claim which dealt with her
demotion.232

225
Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 911. Contra Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309
F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002). There was no private cause of action for Title IX retaliation
for a terminated male former girls’ basketball coach, who allegedly complained of gender
inequities concerning his athletes. The Eleventh Circuit stated, “But the Court has not
overturned the specific holding of Cannon, and so a direct victim of gender
discrimination still may pursue a private right of action under Title IX to remedy the
discrimination she has suffered.” Id. at 1343.
226
Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (emphasis added).
227
See id.
228
Id. at 910.
229
Id. at 912.
230
Id. at 914.
231
Id.
232
See id.
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2. Stanley v. University of Southern California
In 1994, the Ninth Circuit, in Stanley v. University of Southern
California,233 affirmed the district court’s denial of Marianne
Stanley’s motion for a preliminary injunction seeking
reinstatement to her position as the women’s basketball coach.
Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment to the
university on all causes of action.234 Stanley again appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. Some additional pleadings were filed due to the
implementation of new Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) guidelines.235 On June 2, 1999, the Ninth
Circuit finally rendered its 2-1 decision.236
First, as to the Equal Pay Act, the Ninth Circuit stated that the
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the jobs being
compared are “substantially equal.”237 Despite the parties’
differing opinions as to whether the job as head basketball coach
for the men’s and women’s teams were substantially equal, the
appellate court found that the university could pay a different
salary to the men’s head basketball coach due the “markedly
disparate levels of experience and qualifications” between the two
individuals.238 The court took explicit notice that the women’s
basketball coach had fourteen years less coaching experience, had
never coached an Olympic team or authored a book on basketball,
and had no marketing or promotional experience other than that
gained as a coach.239 Thus, the court determined that the
university satisfied one of the affirmative defenses attributable to
an Equal Pay claim, basing the salary on factors other than sex:
233

13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
Stanley v. Univ. S. Cal., No. 93-CV-4708, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5026 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 8, 1995), aff’d, 178 F.3d. 1069 (9th Cir. 1999).
235
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604–1607. See
also Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing the EEOC guidelines for
the first time in a Title IX case).
236
178 F.3d 1069.
237
Id. at 1074.
238
Id. at 1075.
239
Id. at 1075–76 (citing Harker v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 85 F. Supp. 378
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[N]ine year experience differential between women’s and men’s
basketball coaches justifies pay differential . . . .”), but failing to recognize that Stanley
had led her former team to three championships, while the men’s basketball coach had
not).
234
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“Stanley has conspicuously failed, moreover, to present any
meaningful evidence in support of her claim that she and [the
men’s basketball coach] had comparable levels of experience.”240
Dismissing the Title IX cause of action, the court rule that
because “Stanley fails to show any discriminatory conduct on the
part of the defendants, all of these claims fail as well.”241
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit made no mention of the Fifth
Circuit decision in Lowrey, and did not, on its own volition, find
that there is no cause of action for employees asserting Title IX
violations against educational employers. The court also found no
claim of retaliation, although that assertion was not brought
pursuant to Title IX.242 The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded
only as to whether the district court had abused its discretion in
awarding costs to the university in the amount of approximately
$47,000.243
Judge Pregerson’s dissent noted:
By focusing on the differences between Stanley’s and
Raveling’s qualifications, the majority skips over the many
ways in which gender discrimination insidiously affected
the University’s treatment of the women’s basketball
program and Stanley as its Head Coach. The University’s
half-hearted promotion of the women’s basketball program,
its intensive marketing of the men’s basketball program,
and the formidable obstacles Stanley faced as a woman
athlete in a male-dominated profession contributed to this
disparate treatment.244
The Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari in this case.245

240

Id. at 1076.
Id. at 1077.
242
See id.
243
See id. at 1079–80.
244
Id. at 1080 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
245
Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 528 U.S. 1022 (1999). Stanley went on to coach in the
Women’s National Basketball Association, where she was named head coach of the
Washington Mystics. See Mystics Name Coach (No, Not Him), NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Apr. 5,
2002, at A74.
241
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3. Perdue v. City University of New York
During August 1997, the district court judge in Perdue v. City
University of New York,246 following the Fifth Circuit decision in
Lowrey, rejected the Title IX employment cause of action brought
by Molly Perdue,247 the former women’s basketball coach and
women’s sports administrator at Brooklyn College (a part of the
City University of New York (CUNY)), but allowed her claim for
Title IX retaliation to go to the jury.248 The jury found none in the
multi-based cause of action lawsuit.
The following year, the same New York district court ruled on
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII claims, as well as Eleventh
Amendment immunity.249 First, in addressing the Equal Pay Act,
the district court ruled that:
To show a violation of the EPA, a plaintiff need not prove
that an intention to discriminate on the basis of gender
motivated the pay disparity.
Where there is a willful violation of the EPA, the
resulting compensatory award should be doubled as
liquidated damages. A violation of the EPA is willful if
“the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for
the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the
statute.”250

246

No. 93-CV-5939 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1997).
Transcript of Trial Before the Honorable Frederic Block, United States District
Judge, and a Jury, Perdue v. City of New York (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1997) (No. 93-CV5939). Judge Block opined:
I agree with Lakoski [v. James, 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995),] completely insofar
as these basic intentional discrimination and hostile work environment cases
are brought forth, that they are really Title VII claims, and that Title IX should
not give plaintiffs a way of obviating the total remedy and the totality of what
Congress has divined in Title VII by characterizing the same claims,
substantively, as Title IX claims.
Id. at 6, ll. 2–9.
248
Id.
249
Perdue v. City Univ. of N.Y., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
250
Id. at 332–33 (citations omitted) (quoting Reich v. Waldbaum, 52 F.3d 35, 39 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
247
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According to the job descriptions, both the men’s and women’s
sports administrators had the same eleven duties, but Perdue had
an extra duty of being available for guidance of all female studentathletes.251 Perdue reported her inferior working conditions to her
superiors, including that she was doing laundry for the women’s
basketball team, and the conflicting practice times for the men’s
and women’s teams.252 In an interesting aside, the district court
noted that “despite the fact that the Office [for] Civil Rights found
that CUNY [at Brooklyn College] had committed multiple Title IX
violations, there was testimony that CUNY did not implement the
modifications promised in its detailed assurances.” 253 The court
therefore concluded that the College’s actions were willful.254
On June 19, 1998, the trial court judge issued judgment for
$799,566.73 in favor of the plaintiff.255 The court found damages
of $134,829 in back wages, $85,000 in compensatory damages,
$5,262 in unpaid retirement benefits, and $134,829 in liquidated
damages.256 An appeal and a cross-appeal were filed for
determination by the Second Circuit.257 The parties reached a
confidential settlement in April 1999, that the court approved.258

251

See id. at 334.
Id. at 335.
253
Id.
254
See id.
255
Perdue v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 93-CV-5939 (E.D.N.Y. judgment entered June 19,
1998).
256
Id.
257
Id. The parties had been awaiting resolution by the Second Circuit of the appeal in
Anderson v. State University of New York, College at New Paltz, 169 F.3d 117 (2d Cir.
1999), vacated by 528 U.S. 1111 (2000). On remand from the Supreme Court, the
Northern District Court of New York ruled that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit
use of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994), in a case brought by a tenured
female professor. Anderson v. State Univ. of N.Y., 107 F. Supp. 2d 158 (N.D.N.Y.
2000). The professor alleged violation of the Equal Pay Act due to a branch of the New
York State University not paying her equally to her male counterparts. The court held
that the Equal Pay Act was enacted pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 162–63. The parties in the Perdue case had been
contemplating whether they would stay pursuit of their Second Circuit appeal pending the
Supreme Court’s certiorari decision in the Anderson case.
258
Perdue, No. 93-CV-5939 (E.D.N.Y. settlement entered June 22, 1999).
252

5 - HECKMAN FORMAT

2003]

4/15/03 9:51 AM

TITLE IX AT THIRTY

603

4. Weaver v. Ohio State University
In Weaver v. Ohio State University,259 Karen Weaver, a former
women’s field hockey coach, commenced a lawsuit on November
21, 1996, alleging that her termination was predicated on sex
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title IX, Title VII, the
Equal Pay Act, and state law. On June 4, 1997, the Ohio district
court partially granted and partially denied the defendantuniversity’s motion to dismiss. Weaver complained to the
university about the poor condition of the artificial grass practice
field used for field hockey and talked with the NCAA Peer Review
Committee representatives, who visited the campus, in conjunction
with the NCAA program requiring certification about this same
issue. Weaver compared her treatment to the men’s ice hockey
coach’s (as there was no men’s field hockey team offered at OSU),
who received a higher salary than she did. The plaintiff asserted
she was treated
[D]ifferently than male coaches, specifically Randy Ayers,
then coach of the OSU men’s basketball team, who was allegedly
afforded greater tolerance for his team members’ disciplinary
problems. Plaintiff also contends that she was not offered another
position within the OSU Athletic Department upon her
termination, unlike Jerry Welsh, the men’s hockey coach.260
The district court, in a 29-page decision, granted the defendantuniversity motion for summary judgment on all counts.261 The
court initially went over the grounds for the granting of summary
judgment before addressing the substantive claims.
As to the claim of discriminatory discharge pursuant to Title
VII and Title IX, the court found:
[The plaintiff] had produced no direct evidence of
discriminatory motive on the part of the defendants, nor has
259

71 F. Supp. 2d 789 (S.D. Ohio 1998), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1315 (6th Cir. 1999). This
appears to be the first Title IX lawsuit commenced by a women’s field hockey coach. See
also Rallins v. Ohio State Univ., 191 F. Supp. 2d 920 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (dismissing a
female women’s head track and field coach’s Title VII, Equal Pay Act, and Title IX
causes of action predicated on sex discrimination).
260
Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
261
Id. at 789.
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she met her burden of producing evidence sufficient to
satisfy all of the elements of a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge in light of the fact that the person
who was hired to replace her is also a woman.262
Regarding Title IX, the court noted, “The Title VII standards
for proving discriminatory treatment also apply to claims of
employment discrimination brought under Title IX.”263
In
addition, this court would apply the Title VII standards for
retaliation in the Title IX action.264 The court stated:
To prove a prima facie case of retaliation the plaintiff must
show: 1) that she engaged in protected opposition to Title
VII or Title IX discrimination or participated in a Title VII
or Title IX proceeding; 2) that plaintiff’s exercise of her
protected rights was known to the defendants; 3) that she
was subjected to an adverse employment action subsequent
to or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and 4)
that there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.265
In examining the Title IX retaliation claim, the court ruled that
the complaints about the condition of the hockey practice field
were not couched in terms of Title IX sex discrimination.
“Complaints concerning unfair treatment in general which do not
specifically address discrimination are insufficient to constitute
protected activity.”266 Moreover, “[d]efendants also note that the
Title IX complaint would have been unfounded in light of the fact
that the men’s lacrosse team also used the same practice field.” 267
The university also presented evidence that they never had
262

Id. at 793.
Id. (citing Doe v. Claiborne County, Tennessee, 103 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 1996);
Johnson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 1996); Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll.
of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995)).
264
Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 793. See also Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d
242 (5th Cir. 1997).
265
Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (citing Cantia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d
1064, 1066 (6th Cir. 1990)).
266
Id. at 793–94.
267
Id. at 794 (“The turf was replaced in the summer of 1996 when funds became
available.”).
263
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knowledge of the plaintiff’s comments to the NCAA Peer Review
Committee, which were confidential. Based on all of these factors,
there were no grounds for the retaliation claim.268 Weaver was
dismissed a short time after her interview with the NCAA
members. Nonetheless, the court stated, “[T]emporal proximity
between the complaints and the employment action alone is
usually not sufficient to support an inference of retaliatory
discrimination in the absence of other evidence.”269 The male
athletic director testified that he had made his decision to terminate
the field hockey coach prior to her meeting with the NCAA
representatives.270 The court also accepted the defendants’ reason
for terminating the coach, which was based on concerns players
voiced about her style of coaching.271 This provided a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination.272 The judge
elaborated, “The defendants’ reason for terminating plaintiff’s
employment need not be a good reason, but rather only a nondiscriminatory reason.”273 Although the plaintiff contended that
her strong stance on the university anti-drug and alcohol policy
was a factor in the discharge,274 the court ruled that she lacked
standing.275
As to the Equal Pay Act, the court emphasized, “A plaintiff’s
comparison to a specifically chosen employee should be
scrutinized closely to determine its usefulness. Courts which have
addressed the merits of Equal Pay Act claims advanced by coaches
of athletic teams have been reluctant to find an equality of work
between coaches of different sports.”276 The decision went on to
268

Id. at 793.
Id. at 794.
270
Id.
271
Id. at 795–96.
272
Id. at 796.
273
Id.
274
Id. at 796–97.
275
See Heckman, supra note 10, at 865 n.129.
276
Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 799–800 (citations omitted) (citing EEOC v. Madison
Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 584 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting findings of
equality between boy’s soccer and girls’ volleyball and basketball teams and between
boy’s track and girl’s basketball teams); Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 961
(D. Minn. 1994) (finding women’s gymnastic coach not substantially equal to men’s
football, hockey, and basketball coaches)).
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summarize the relevant elements for an Equal Pay Act claim,
pronouncing:
In determining whether men’s and women’s coaching
positions are equal, courts have looked to such factors as
team size, the number of assistant coaches, recruiting
responsibilities, the amount of spectator attendance and
community interest in the sport, the amount of revenue
generated by the sport, the degree of responsibility in the
area of public and media relations and promotional
activities, and the relative importance of the sport in the
athletic program as a whole.277
The court found that the field hockey season spanned only
about two months, featuring nineteen to twenty-one games,
whereas ice hockey extended over five months, with larger squads
playing thirty-five to thirty-eight games.278 Once again, as in
Stanley,279 the men’s ice hockey coach had “a greater burden in the
public relations area.”280
Also, the men’s team produced
substantially more revenue than the field hockey team.281 The
university also articulated a market condition defense for paying
the men’s ice hockey coach more: since there was professional ice
hockey and there was no equivalent for field hockey, the best ice
hockey college coaches would be more actively recruited by other
schools.282 No statistics were provided for this statement.
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s salary was above the salary for the
average field hockey coach in the Big Ten Conference, of which
OSU was a member, as well as the NCAA average.283
In a first judicial reference to the new 1997 EEOC Guidelines
in the area of educational athletics programs and Title VII and the
277

Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 800 (citing Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313,
1321–23 (9th Cir. 1994); Bartges v. Univ. of N.C., 908 F. Supp. 1312, 1323–26
(W.D.N.C. 1995), aff’d, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996); Deli, 863 F. Supp. at 961; Jacobs v.
Coll. of William & Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff’d, 661 F.2d 922
(4th Cir. 1981)).
278
Id.
279
13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 801.
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Equal Pay Act, the court dismissed them out-of-hand stating,
“While plaintiff cites non-binding Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guidelines published in October of 1997 which call
for a comparable worth analysis, such guidelines do not have the
effect of agency regulations and are not entitled to deference.”284
The court concluded:
Only the men’s football coach and the men’s and women’s
basketball coaches are given multi-year contracts. There is
no evidence that the job of women’s field hockey is
substantially identical to any of these multi-year positions,
and a substantial number of male coaches of comparable
minor sports teams are impacted equally with female
coaches by this policy.285
The Sixth Circuit summarily affirmed the decision.286
5. Other Pending Cases
In Bedard v. Roger Williams University,287 the former female
associate athletic director unsuccessfully brought suit against a
Division III university for failing to be promoted to the position of
athletic director. The court found that the university’s actions did
not constitute sex discrimination in violation of Title IX where the
university hired a male applicant to fill the position.
In October, 1998, the Illinois district court, in Harper v. Illinois
State University,288 granted in part and denied in part the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment concerning the coach of
a women’s basketball team, who alleged sex discrimination. In
Legoff v. Trustees of Boston University,289 the district court
284

Id. See also EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11 (2002).
285
Weaver, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 802. See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 764–66
(discussing the EEOC Guidelines).
286
Weaver v. Ohio State Univ., 194 F.3d 1315 (6th Cir. 1999).
287
989 F. Supp. 94 (D.R.I. 1997). See also generally McKenzie v. Wright State Univ.,
683 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (ruling that a former assistant women’s basketball
coach did not establish her claim of sex discrimination and noting that the coach
advanced no Title IX claim).
288
35 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
289
23 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D. Mass. 1998).

5 - HECKMAN FORMAT

608

4/15/03 9:51 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13: 551

examined whether a former women’s basketball coach at Boston
University had satisfied the statute of limitations for commencing
her lawsuit. In Deli v. University of Minnesota,290 a former
women’s gymnastics coach, who had previously sought damages
pursuant to Title IX,291 could not recover for emotional distress
damages.292 In this state court action, the plaintiff asserted
violation of promissory estoppel based on the athletic director’s
alleged breach of an oral promise not to view a videotape that
contained both the gymnastics team’s performance and the coach’s
sexual encounter with her husband, an assistant coach of the team,
who was also terminated. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
overturned the state judge’s award of $675,000 in damages.293
The first Title IX decision concerning a referee was rendered in
Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n,294 where
Noreen Kemether, a female basketball referee, alleged sex
discrimination against the Pennsylvania Interscholastic High
School Athletic Association (PIAA) for assigning her a work
schedule which excluded boys’ high school basketball games.295
The Pennsylvania district court, in addressing motions for
summary judgment submitted by both sides, initially found that the
athletic association was not the referee’s employer for purposes of
Title VII employment discrimination;296 however, an issue of fact
remained as to whether the athletic association was an employment
agency so as to trigger Title VII.297 As to the Title IX claim, the
290

No. C9-97-1530 (Minn. Ct. App. May 19, 1998).
Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1994) (granting defendantuniversity’s motion for summary judgment). See also Gabor Deli v. Univ. of Minn., No.
93-CV-0501 (D. Minn. Aug. 18, 1994) (granting defendant-university’s motion for
summary judgment concerning the lawsuit alleging violation of a number of grounds,
including Title IX, based on the university’s termination of the male former assistant
women’s gymnastics coach).
292
Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 578 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). See also Deli v.
Univ. of Minn., 511 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming termination of the
coaches despite lack of strict adherence to procedural due process set forth in the
university manual).
293
Deli, 578 N.W.2d at 784.
294
15 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
295
Id. at 743–44.
296
Id. at 758 (concerning the regular season). See also id. at 761 (addressing the postseason arrangement).
297
Id. at 764.
291
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court ruled that an issue of fact remained;298 secondarily, Title IX
subsumed the section 1983 cause of action alleged because of the
Equal Protection Clause.299 After the trial, the jury awarded
Kemether $314,000 in compensatory damages against the state
athletic association.300 The jury found that the PIAA’s refusal to
evaluate women was “a necessary step toward being assigned to
[referee] regular season boys’ junior and varsity high school
games.”301 The association sought to have the award thrown out.
On further review, the Pennsylvania district court denied the
association’s request for a new trial and for a judgment in its favor
as a matter of law.302
6. Cases settled
A number of cases, all involving intercollegiate coaches who
were terminated, were settled from 1997 to 2000,303 including
Carver v. St. Leo’s College,304 where the head coach and assistant
coach—both males—of the successful women’s softball
intercollegiate team at the college brought a lawsuit regarding their
suspension. On March 27, 1997, the district court held one need
not be a student to advance a Title IX claim for retaliation.305
In 1997, the parties in Hawkins v. Loyola University306 settled
the case brought by a male women’s basketball coach who was
terminated, alleging sexual discrimination. That summer, the
parties in Gobrecht v. Reed307 settled a case brought by a former
women’s basketball coach at Florida State University. Later that
298

Id. at 766 (finding that the athletic association would be within Title IX’s scope).
Id. at 767 (restricting this ruling only to the Fourteenth Amendment claim and not
the First Amendment claim advanced by the plaintiff).
300
Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, No. 96-CV-6986, 1999 WL 1012957,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 1999).
301
Id.
302
Id.
303
See, e.g., Plotzke v. Boston Coll., No. 94-CV-12329 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 1995)
(involving the termination of a female women’s basketball coach at the university). See
also Heckman, supra note 25, at 421 n.142.
304
No. 96-383-CIV-T-25C (M.D. Fla. 1996). See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 764
(discussing Carver).
305
Carver, No. 96-383-CIV-T-25C.
306
No. 94-L03300 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 1997).
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No. 497-CV-237 (N.D. Fla. 1997).
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year, in Dugan v. State of Oregon,308 the parties settled the case,
reportedly for $1.09 million, after the jury issued a million-dollar
plus verdict in favor of the former female women’s softball coach
at Oregon State University.309 In November, 1998, the parties
settled in Masten v. Truman State University,310 involving a female
former women’s volleyball coach. This settlement is noteworthy
as the university, in addition to reaching a monetary settlement
with the coach, agreed to ensure equitable conditions for its female
student-athletes. In another instance, Perdue University and Lin
Dunn, a female former women’s basketball coach, reached an
agreement prior to any lawsuit.311
E. Retaliation
Title IX prohibits retaliation312 by educational institutions
against individuals who claim a violation of statutorily prescribed
gender equity. Claims predicated on the retaliation portion of Title
IX were neglected until recently.313 In a number of recent cases,
coaches who were terminated also raised claims of unlawful
retaliation.314
308

No. 95-CV-6250 (D. Or. 1997).
Id. See also Heckman, supra note 170, at 762–63 (“However, the Court granted the
institution’s motion for a remittitur, in part, reducing the [total] jury award of $1.28
million to approximately $724,000, including $285,000 against the individual defendant,
plus post-judgment interest.”); Sarah Nathanson, Title IX Report Card, WOMEN’S SPORTS
EXPERIENCE, May/June 1999, at 13; Brian A. Snow, Broadening the Demand for GenderEquity in Athletics: Financial Aid & Coaches’ Compensation, 130 EDUC. L. REP. 965,
985 (1997).
310
1998 WL 2570894 (D. Mo. 1998). Truman State University (Missouri) agreed to
pay former women’s volleyball coach, Deborah Masten, $175,000 and to provide equal
treatment for women athletes. Id. See also Karen Dillon, Truman to Provide Gender
Equity, Give Ex-Coach $175,000, KANSAS CITY STAR, Nov. 6, 1998, at D1.
311
See Barbara Baker, It’s A Dunn Deal, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 28, 1999, at C7.
312
34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (2002).
313
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Regents, No. 94-CV-0289 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn. Jan. 30, 1995)
(regarding sex discrimination claim brought by Stephanie Schleuder, the women’s
volleyball coach of the University of Minnesota at Twin Cities, who had been an ardent
supporter of pay equity). The case was settled during April 1995. Schleuder had
previously voluntarily dismissed her federal lawsuit after her request for a temporary
restraining order was denied. See Governmental Affairs Report, NCAA REG., Apr. 26,
1995, at 1, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/1995/19950426.pdf.
314
See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002);
Gobrecht v. Reed, No. 497-CV-0237 (N.D. Fla. 1997); Lowrey v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys.,
309
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F. Reverse Discrimination
In a move toward gender parity between men’s and women’s
coaches, one university reduced the salary of the men’s basketball
coach to that received by the women’s basketball coach, rather
than raising the salary of the women’s coach to match the salary of
the men’s team. The male coach in Reinhart v. Georgia State
University,315 brought suit alleging reverse sex discrimination. The
complaint raised no Title IX claim. On July 1, 1997, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s granting of the university’s
motion for summary judgment.316
CONCLUSION
Remarkable progress has been made by women in the
twentieth century due to increased educational opportunities. As
the nation celebrates Title IX’s thirtieth anniversary, however,
continued progress needs to be made in this area to ensure the
promise of equal opportunity for the students and employees of
educational institutions.
The courts and litigants continue to explore the parameters of
Title IX, while Congress, for the most part, has exhibited a handsoff policy. On the legislative front, Congress should clarify
whether Title IX was meant to preempt section 1983 actions.317
Congress should impose a national statute of limitations to govern
private lawsuits. Congress should consider eliminating the contact
sports element found in the Title IX regulations, which continues
to insulate men’s teams to the detriment of capable and interested
female student-athletes (recognizing that the reverse could
seriously erode “female” or “coed” teams). One solution is to
adopt a standard such as the state of New York allows for its

No. 95-CV-4334 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 1995), aff’d, 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997); Clay v.
Bd. of Trs. of Neosho Cmty. Coll., 905 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Kan. 1995); Perdue v. City
Univ. of N.Y., 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Carter v. Cornell Univ., 976 F. Supp.
224 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
315
No. 95-CV-0204 (N.D. Ga. 1996), aff’d without op., 119 F.3d 11 (11th Cir. 1997).
316
Reinhart, 119 F.3d at 11.
317
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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interscholastic athletes in grades seven through twelve, identified
herein.
The Department of Education’s formation of a Title IX
commission to investigate the application of the law to
intercollegiate athletic departments could have profound effects in
seriously eroding the precarious advancements that have been
achieved in the last thirty years, including possibly eviscerating
the effective accommodation test and effectively negating the
strong consensus exhibited by the circuit courts.
The Supreme Court dove into the Title IX waters by agreeing
to hear three appeals in recent years. In Smith, the Court ruled on
whether the NCAA, the pre-eminent collegiate athletic association,
was a recipient of federal funds due to its receipt of funds from
member post-secondary institutions that had received federal
funds, to engender jurisdiction. The Court concluded the NCAA
was not bound by Title IX based on the facts presented. The
Supreme Court in Gebser imposed a tough standard for
establishing liability by students against educational institutions for
teacher-student sexual harassment. The Court followed this in
Davis, imposing a strict standard for those claiming peer sexual
harassment against educational institutions.
An unanswered question that has emerged is whether the
Gebser decision requires all individuals to place the offending
educational institutions on notice in Title IX cases, even when not
pursuing a sexual harassment claim. Queries also arise as to
specifically who would be required to be informed and what serves
as sufficient notice. This uncertainty could significantly foreclose
student-athletes from seeking redress in cross-over or equal
opportunity cases. An educational institution may be unaware of
the intentional harassing actions by an employee, as was at issue in
Gebser. However, the issue becomes troublesome with claims
involving lack of gender equity in athletics departments, where
elementary, secondary, and post-secondary schools are clearly
aware of how many students are participating in athletic
departments, the history of their athletic departments as well as the
allocation of scholarships, supplies, equipment, the number of
coaches and tutors, and other provisions offered when separate
athletic departments are provided. Will educational institutions be
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shielded from possible Title IX liability because the student or
prospective student-athlete did not inform the proper authority of
the failure to provide equal opportunity in the selection of sports or
benefits accorded or athletic scholarship money provided?
Physical education classes: Despite the passage of thirty
years, there has been no case law involving the conduct of physical
education classes.
Cross-over cases: In the area of athletics, cross-over litigation
has slowed down involving interscholastic athletics. Remarkably,
the Mercer case is the only decision involving an individual of one
sex seeking to participate on the team composed of members of the
other sex on the intercollegiate level. While this NCAA Division I
team at Duke University was deemed a coed team no females had
ever been a formal part of the team, and Mercer would complete
her undergraduate degree without being included on the official
roster. While the Fourth Circuit recently rejected allowing
punitive damages against the private university, the jury verdict
awarding $2 million in punitive damages nevertheless sent a strong
message.
Female athletes and the selection of sports: The last decade
has been engulfed with the issue of whether the first program area
involving the selection of sports when separate athletic programs
are provided for males and females, as required by the equal
opportunity subsection, has been met, played out exclusively on
the intercollegiate level. Seven Circuit Courts (First, Third, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits) have all approved use of
the effective accommodation test to ascertain whether the first
program area has been satisfied. Until 2001, female collegiate
students were successful on the federal circuit court level in every
Title IX lawsuit commenced alleging the lack of equal opportunity
in the provision of athletic opportunities. The Eighth Circuit
decision in Grandson broke that record, and should be monitored
to determine whether the strict Gebser notice standard will be
imposed on non-sexual harassment Title IX matters in other
jurisdictions. A Newsday editorial summarized the resultant
benefits of the Title IX statute, stating:
It was a proud day for soccer moms—and their daughters
too. But the U.S. women’s soccer team’s recent World
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Cup win over China was one more victory, too, for Title
IX, which bought equal access to sports for girls. The
women’s soccer team, the Olympic gold medal-winning
U.S. women’s hockey team and the ongoing, televised and
popular Women’s National Basketball Association teams
would not have been possible without the still-controversial
1972 change in federal law. Title IX has paved the way for
girls to go into good sports programs by barring sex
discrimination in federally funded education programs. As
a result, more and more female athletes are finding
themselves on winning teams. If the trend continues, as it
should, don’t be surprised to see the creation of women’s
professional teams in other sports as well.318
Male athletes and the selection of sports: Male athletes
continue to be foreclosed from Title IX relief when seeking to
maintain their varsity teams, overwhelmingly for meeting the first
prong of the “effective accommodation” test. Despite the passage
of thirty years, no court has ever pronounced an acceptable
percentage differential to meet the first prong, which requires
substantial proportionality between the percentage of students and
the percentage of student-athletes of that same sex. Despite the
lack of success in the judicial arena, men may have achieved an
end-run by commencing a 2002 class action lawsuit, which
purportedly led to the formation of the Department of Education’s
Title IX Commission, which may be the catalyst to destroy the
underpinnings of the statutory gender equity.
Provision of benefits: The emerging inquiry will be how
strictly the courts will enforce the equal opportunity requirements
for the component benefits and treatments afforded athletic
programs that have separate teams for males and females. Despite
the passage of thirty years, it is only recently that this matter is
being judicially reviewed. As was previously highlighted, one
district court perceptively noted, “[u]nfortunately, the Board’s plan
leaves much to be desired; it creates the impression that the Board

318

Editorial, Thank Title IX, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), July 24, 1999, at A18.
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is not as sensitive as it should be regarding the necessity of
compliance with Title IX.”319
Athletic scholarships: Moreover, no court has ever
pronounced an acceptable percentage differential to satisfy the
allocation of athletic scholarships when separate programs are
provided for male and female student-athletes. However, the OCR
indicated that it would accept a one percent differential (or one
scholarship) between the percentage of athletes of one sex and the
percentage of athletic scholarships for the student-athletes.
Funding of athletic departments: The funding loophole
continues to allow inequitable funding, as the regulations only
require “necessary funding.”
Athletic department employees: The initiation of Title IX
lawsuits by educational employees, including female athletic
employees or coaches of women’s teams, has increased
dramatically. The issue of whether a litigant may raise a Title IX
cause of action for sex discrimination, aside from asserting Title
IX-based retaliation, remains unresolved. Recent developments—
including settlements in the Lowrey v. Texas A&M University
System lawsuit (after the issuance of the Fifth Circuit decision
rejecting Title IX as a basis to assert sex discrimination as opposed
to retaliation) and the Perdue v. City University of New York case,
as well as decisions not to appeal after the long-awaited decision
by the Ninth Circuit in Stanley v. University of Southern California
and the Sixth Circuit decision in Weaver v. Ohio State
University—do not help to resolve the issue. Ultimately, it will
probably require a Supreme Court resolution unless Congress
chooses to act. The dramatic lack of females coaching males
continues to be ignored, and is ripe for a major lawsuit. This
coincides with the low numbers of women employed as head
athletic administrators, or sports information directors nationally.
The “glass sneaker” continues to exist for females in athletics
and its continued vulnerability has become glaringly evident since
entering the new millennium. Aside from the failure to ensure
gender equity in athletics thirty years later, there is another
319

Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, Fla., 995 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (M.D. Fla.
1997).
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potentially devastating issue percolating on the horizon as to
whether the Eleventh Amendment will eviscerate Title IX’s
application to state educational institutions. Moreover, the case
commenced by the National Wrestling Coaches Association must
be watched as it attempts to eviscerate the Title IX regulations and
Policy Interpretation. Additionally, the Secretary of Education’s
action, in response to the issuance of the February 2003 report by
the Department of Education’s Title IX commission, should be
monitored to determine any restrictions in the statute’s application
to extracurricular athletics. The Title IX history has not been a
smooth one. The good news is that the spirit of Title IX continues
to persevere despite significant obstacles.
The twenty-first century provides an uncharted landscape to
truly implement the law and spirit of Title IX eliminating
discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs and
activities by providing not some opportunity for females, but equal
opportunity for all.

